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INTRODUCTION 
Theologians reflect on the relationship between 
God and man. Because of the Christian conception of God, 
Christian theology is dependent on, and requires some theory 
about, God's self-revelation. Different Christian theolo-
gians in different eras have explored different aspects of 
man's existence as means through which God reveals himself. 
Such sources of knowledge include Scripture, history, rea-
son, and experience. Different theologians also employ 
different techniques in reflecting on revelation. In order 
to understand a specific theologian, we must know what he 
uses as his source of revealed information, and understand 
how he uses that source. Within this context, we will be 
able to understand his theological positions in their ful-
lest sense. We will be able to tell where these positions 
come from, what they mean in themselves, and what implica-
tions they have. 
When the Fathers of the early Christian Church did 
theology, they used Scripture as their primary source for 
God's revelation. Biblical interpretation was the body and 
bones of their theology. The techniques which they used to 
interpret Scripture incorporated various philosophical posi-
tions, which therefore influenced their theological under-
standing; but the primary focus of their theological reflec-
tion was the text of Scripture. 
1 
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Origen has been identified as the first Christian 
"theologian," with the implication that he is the first to 
have moved beyond Biblical interpretation to speculative 
theology. But in his own writings, Origen makes no distinc-
tion between these two functions. Origen reflects theologi-
cally by interpreting Scripture. The correct interpretation 
of Scripture produces sound theological speculation. 
Origen's particular exegetical technique, allegory, 
allows him to engage in extensive speculation. Allegory 
assumes that the text means more than the words themselves 
are able to directly communicate. But as Origen develops 
his allegorical method, we see that he is not free to im-
port whatever meaning he desires into the text. For Origen, 
allegory is not primarily a means of deriving relevant in-
formation from a recalcitrant text. If this were the case, 
Origen's criteria for relevancy would be the guiding princi-
ples of his interpretation. Rather, Origen believes allego-
ry is the way to allow Scripture to interpret itself. The 
text of Scripture is not obscure and recalcitrant; it is 
mysteriously relevatory. Scripture is the specific means 
which God has chosen to reveal himself to man. By allowing 
Scripture to reveal its mysteries--and for Origen this means 
by pursuing allegorical interpretations--the theologian is 
able to reflect on God's self-revelation. 
Since Origen does theology through scriptural inter-
pretation, an examination of a specific theological doctrine 
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depends on an understanding of Origen•s interpretation of 
the texts in which he finds this doctrine. Since the alle-
gorical technique presupposes a vast interconnection of 
scriptural texts, and interprets these texts in the light 
of each other, developing such an understanding of Origen•s 
interpretations is a formidable task. The best approach 
for studying Origen•s theology is a close examination of his 
interpretations of specific texts as he uses these texts to 
develop a specific theological position. 
This thesis is an examination of Origen•s interpre-
tations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9--the two biblical ac-
counts of the creation of man--in order to better under-
stand Origen•s theological anthropology, and the soterio-
logical element of Origen's incarnational theology. Origen 
uses these texts to develop his description of the human 
condition. 
When early Christian writers discuss the human con-
dition, the subject of the human problem is necessarily in-
cluded. For the early Church, man's existence is obviously 
flawed, especially in regards to man's relationship with 
God. Any discussion of the human condition involves a dis-
cussion of what is wrong with the human condition. When 
early Christian theologians discuss theological anthropolo-
gy, they are engaged in diagnosing the problem which is in-
herent in man's existence, due to man's culpable action. 
Such a diagnosis sets the stage for presenting a 
cure. 
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Origen and other early Christian writers analyze the 
problem inherent in man's current existence from a perspec-
tive which presupposes the Christian solution to this prob-
lem: the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Therefore, any discussion of Origen's theological anthropol-
ogy will lead to an examination of Origen's soteriology. 
When Origen uses his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 
and Gen 2:4-9 to develop his theological anthropology, he 
draws on a tradition of interpretation which has been heavi-
ly influenced by Philo of Alexandria. Philo's interpreta-
tions of these verses examine the role of the Logos in the 
creation of man, and in the relationship between God and 
man. Therefore, we might expect that Origen's Logos theolo-
gy has been heavily influenced by Philo's Logos theology. 
Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 
2:4-9 are crucial to his theological anthropology. But 
Origen draws on Philo's interpretations of these passages 
in his own work. Philo writes from a non-Christian perspec-
tive, and therefore his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and 
Gen 2:4-9 and his theological anthropology do not correspond 
to a Christian belief in the saving activity of Christ's 
life, death and resurrection. Since Origen uses Philo's 
interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 to develop his 
own theological anthropology, we might expect Origen's theo-
logical anthropology to lack an intrinsic correspondence 
to Christian soteriology. We might expect Origen's theo-
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logical anthropology to presuppose a "Philonic'' soteriology. 
Origen may describe the problem inherent in man's current 
existence in such a way that Philo's marriage of Judaism and 
Middle Platonism is the implied solution. 
By examining Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 
and Gen 2:4-9 and the theological anthropology which he 
develops through these interpretations we discover that this 
is not the case. Origen's use of Philonic interpretations 
in his own work does not lead him to neglect the implica-
tions of Christian soteriology. On the contrary, Origen 
adapts Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 
to emphasize the soteriological aspect of the Incarnation of 
the Logos--even though the concept of the Incarnation is 
alien to Philo's perspective. Thus, Origen uses non-Christ-
ian elements to develop a distinctively Christian theologi-
cal anthropology: an understanding of the defect in man's 
existence which requires the Incarnation of the Logos as 
Jesus Christ as its resolution. 
This thesis proposes to establish the contention 
that Origen's theological anthropology, as he develops it 
through his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9, 
involves specific reference to the Incarnation as a neces-
sary component in the saving work of the Logos. In order to 
establish this contention, Origen's interpretations of Gen 
1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 must be carefully examined. Such an 
examination requires a thorough understanding of Origen's 
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exegetical method and general treatment of Scripture. The 
first chapter of this thesis will attempt to provide such an 
understanding of Origen's use of the allegorical method. 
The second chapter will use this understanding of 
Origen's exegetical technique to examine his interpretations 
of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9. Origen tends to neglect Gen 
2:4-9 in favor of Gen 1:26-30; therefore, Origen's first 
Homily on Genesis, the most comprehensive interpretation of 
Gen 1:26-30 in his surviving works, will be the foundation 
for this examination. The concepts and issues which Origen 
derives from Gen 1:26-30 in this homily will be the foci for 
our examination of all other interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 
and Gen 2:4-9 which occur in Origen's writings. 
Since Origen does not develop these interpretations 
in a vacuum, we must explore the various influences on, and 
sources of, Origen's work if we are to adequately understand 
this work. Chapter Three will consist of an_exploration of 
the two most probable influences on Origen's interpretations 
of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9: Clement of Alexandria and 
Philo of Alexandria. By comparing the interpretations of 
the authors with Origen's, we will be able to highlight 
specific characteristics of Origen's interpretations and 
discover the implications and assumptions of these inter-
pretations. At the end of these three chapters, we should 
have a thorough understanding of the content and implica-
tions of Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 
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2:4-9. 
The last chapter of this thesis will correlate the 
theological anthropology which Origen develops in these 
interpretations with the soteriological "solutions" which 
this anthropology presupposes. Our task is simplified since 
Origen sometimes makes this correlation himself. Origen 
sometimes uses his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 
2:4-9 to explicitly present aspects of his understanding of 
the saving work of Christ. In other cases, Origen's soteri-
ology is only implicitly present through his theological 
anthropology. By examining the explicit and implicit soter-
iological aspects of Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 
and Gen 2:4-9, we will be able to see how Origen develops an 
understanding of the human problem which requires the Incar-
nation of the Logos as its solution. 
CHAPTER I 
ORIGEN'S EXEGETICAL METHOD 
Before examining the specific interpretation which 
Origen gives to the creation of man stories in Genesis, we 
must examine his general understanding of the character of 
Scripture and its interpretation. This examination will 
include an analysis of what Origen thinks Scripture is, what 
purpose Scripture has and how it achieves this purpose. 
Secondly, Origen's conception of the three levels of mean-
ing within Scripture will be explored, as a principle which 
governs his exegetical method. Finally, since the methods 
of interpretation which Origen uses are based upon this 
understanding of Scripture, an examination of these tech-
niques will follow this analysis. 
I. The Nature and Purpose of Scripture 
When Origen deals with Scripture, he is dealing 
for the most part with the Bible used by modern believers: 
the books which Origen considered canonical are roughly 
the books included in the modern Catholic canon.l Origen 
considers the Septuagint the authoritative text for the 
Old Testament, even where it differs from the Hebrew text, 
since he maintains the tradition of the divine inspiration 
of this translation.2 Nevertheless, Origen is sensitive 
8 
9 
to the possibility that some Septuagint texts have been cor-
rupted in their transmission, and therefore uses the Hebrew 
text and other Greek translations to establish the proper 
version of the Septuagint text.3 While Origen considers the 
Septuagint to be the divinely inspired Scripture of the 
Christian faith, he is sensitive to the textual problems 
arising from the transmission of this text. 
In considering Scripture as divinely inspired, 
Origen maintains that Scripture carries God's power and 
authority. The content of Scripture is essentially divine 
truth, truth revealed by God and therefore supremely trust-
worthy. In the final analysis, Origen considers Scripture 
to be the only consistently reliable source of information 
regarding God's teaching available to mankind.4 
Scripture must be a reliable source of God's teach-
ing, since Scripture's function is to reveal the truth about 
God. By communicating these truths, Scripture leads man 
to God. Thus, Scripture contains all of the doctrines of 
Christian faith, and all of the truths about God which human 
language is capable of conveying. The frailty of human 
language is a limitation. Sometimes the truths are communi-
cated in fragmentary or shadowy fashion, but such is the 
"sacramental mystery" of this life as a whole. What man 
can apprehend in his present state is only a "copy" of the 
perfect comprehension which is possible to the purified, 
perfect soul. But the "copy" which we are able to compre-
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hend can still lead us to the higher truths by training our 
"spiritual intelligence."5 Thus, Scripture acts as a figure 
of the eternal truth, and therefore as a path to the eternal 
truth.6 The possession of perfect truth is itself union 
with God, so Scripture is primarily God's instrument for 
leading mankind to this union. Since this truth is essen-
tially "spiritual," Scripture is intended to convey to hu-
manity information about, and the requirements of, the spir-
itual life.? Although Scripture, the pathway to perfection, 
may be accepted and employed by a community of believers, 
the emphasis of this type of understanding of Scripture, 
God, and perfection tends to be on the efforts of the 
individual soul. While Origen is committed to the Church, 
his fundamental bias is towards exploring the character and 
duties of the individual's spiritual life, and his inter-
pretation of Scripture reflects this bias.B 
But while Origen considers the content of Scripture 
to be eminently trustworthy, he qualifies the confidence 
with which he approaches Scripture with three codicils. 
First, Origen considers Scripture to be a unified, inspired 
text which God has given to his Church to lead its members 
to unity with him. Thus the contents of Scripture must be 
understood in light of the whole of Scripture, and the pur-
pose for which Scripture has been given. This principle 
of totality leads Origen to assert that individual passages 
of Scripture must be interpreted in a manner consistent with 
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the rest of Scripture, and with the purpose of Scripture, in 
order to be trustworthy. Therefore, passages of Scripture 
which seem to assert something which is inconsistent with 
the rest of Scripture, or which do not contribute to lead-
ing mankind towards unity with God, such passages must be 
understood in a non-literal fashion if their divinely in-
spired content is to be received.9 
The principle that Scripture must be treated as a 
coherent whole governs Origen's understanding of the rela-
tionship between the Old Testament and the New Testament. 
Some modern authors have suggested that Origen understands 
the New Testament as superceding the Old, in the sense that 
the New Testament has made the Old Testament obsolete.10 
Origen's use of New Testament interpretations of the older 
scriptures may have contributed to this theory. The Old 
Testament must be understood in the light of the New Testa-
ment, whose message moves beyond the preliminary stages 
which the Old Testament scriptures provided. But Origen's 
attitude toward the Old Testament is more positive: the 
Old Testament scriptures form a unity with the New Testa-
ment. The Old Testament must be interpreted in the light 
of the New Testament because the New Testament reveals the 
true meaning of the Old, which is essentially the Christian 
Gospel. Thus, rather than superceding it, the New Testament 
allows the Old Testament to come into its own; the true 
meaning of the Old Testament is, and was intended to be, 
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Christian.ll The interpretation of any passage of Scripture 
must be consistent with the correct, i.e., Christian inter-
pretation of the rest of Scripture. Such a proper interpre-
tation of an Old Testament passage may indicate the correct 
interpretation of a passage from the New Testament. There-
fore, the trustworthy character of Scripture depends upon 
the correct interpretation of Scripture, which can only be 
determined when Scripture is treated as a 11 Seamless gar-
ment ... 
The second qualification which Origen makes to the 
trustworthiness of Scripture is that Scripture must be in-
terpreted properly in order to be trusted. This correct 
interpretation is itself dependent upon divine inspiration. 
The true meaning of Scripture, the divinely inspired and 
trustworthy content of Scripture, is only available to those 
who have been inspired by the grace of God. This inspira-
tion belongs to all Christians due to the grace which they 
received at baptism, so all Christians have some idea of 
the true meaning of Scripture.l2 But the inspiration to 
more deeply comprehend the meaning of Scripture is a special 
charism, theoretically available to all Christians, but 
actually bestowed only upon those who are capable of under-
standing (and thus profitting from) the deeper meaning of 
Scripture.l3 This deeper meaning is the content which God 
primarily intends the Scripture to convey, and so is also 
the meaning intended by the inspired author of the text. 
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While Origen asserts that the inspired character of Scrip-
ture is thus directly related to the intended meaning of 
the author, he also maintains that this meaning is not 
available to the reader without divine inspiration leading 
to the correct, spiritual understanding of the text.14 
The third qualification which Origen makes regarding 
the trustworthiness of Scripture is that, while Scripture 
is, as a whole, the only reliable source of God's teaching 
generally available to humanity, it is nevertheless incom-
plete; human language is incapable of expressing all of the 
mysteries of God. Thus, the truth communicated by Scripture 
is limited by the medium through which it is communicated. 
Origen implies that some human individuals (for example, the 
author of John's gospel or Paul) have a direct relationship 
to these inexpressible mysteries, and are able to obtain 
more complete knowledge of God than could be communicated in 
writing.15 This is clearly not possible for the average 
believer. Origen seems to have included this codicil re-
garding the trustworthiness of Scripture to avoid 11 idolatry 11 
in regard to Scripture, rather than to recommend some alter-
native source for knowledge of God. Origen wants to stress 
the existence of ultimate truth, the 11 eternal gospel 11 to 
which Scripture points, but which it cannot entirely commun-
icate, rather than to suggest this eternal gospel as a re-
placement for Scripture.16 
This quasi-independence of divine truth from the 
14 
scriptural text is another reason why the exegete is depend-
ent upon divine assistance to interpret the text. The 
frailty of human language, which prevents Scripture from 
containing and revealing the complete, eternal truth of God 
also afflicts the other forms of human knowledge. There-
fore, such knowledge is of limited usefulness in interpret-
ing Scripture. Although he employs "secular" techniques of 
textual and literary criticism as a preliminary phase of his 
exegesis, often using these techniques to establish the 
text's literal/historical meaning, Origen primarily relies 
upon Scripture itself to interpret Scripture. Since Scrip-
ture must be accepted as a unified whole, difficult passages 
within Scripture must be understood in the light of the rest 
of Scripture.l7 
The illumination that Scripture imparts to difficult 
passages may take several forms. A New Testament author may 
include, and thus interpret, an Old Testament passage within 
his inspired text. When this occurs, the New Testament 
author's interpretation is inspired and authoritative.l8 
In some instances, Scripture itself provides exegetical 
instructions. Origen points to the letters of Paul as 
providing instructions for correctly interpreting the Law, 
and to Proverbs as establishing the "three-fold sense of 
Scripture" principle which is so prominent in Origen' s 
writings.l9 
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II. Scripture's Three Levels of Meaning 
In this examination of Origen•s understanding of the 
nature of Scripture, mention has been made of his principle 
of the three levels of meaning which Scripture contains. 
This theory is prominent in Origen•s exegetical writings, 
and an examination of this theory is necessary to under-
standing how Origen perceives Scripture, and how he inter-
prets it. Origen describes this theory clearly in De 
Principiis IV,2,4: 
One must therefore portray the meaning of Scripture in a 
three-fold way upon one's own soul, so that the simple 
man may be edified by what we may call the flesh of the 
scripture, this name being given to the obvious meaning 
of scripture; while the man who has made some progress 
may be edified by its soul, as it were; and the man who 
is perfect ... may be edified by the spiritual law, 
which has •a shadow of the good things to come.• For 
just as a man consists of body, soul and spirit, so in 
the same way does scripture, which has been prepared by 
God to be given for man's salvation.20 
This passage has several ambiguities. The first is 
the way in which Origen intends this theory to be applied in 
exegesis. The most common understanding among scholars is 
that Origen maintains that the three levels of meaning in 
Scripture are all valid, but useful for different types of 
men. The "obvious meaning 11 of Scripture is useful and 
edifying for simple believers, who are incapable of compre-
bending the deeper meaning, the "mysteries" of Scripture. 
Scripture's level of meaning which corresponds to the soul 
is edifying for those who have advanced from simple belief, 
but who have not yet achieved a "spiritual capacity" as 
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such. The highest or deepest level of meaning is the path-
way of perfection proper--the level at which the believer 
is able to perceive the spiritual truths.21 
The passage cited above certainly supports this 
understanding, but with some ambiguity. Origen advises that 
we apply this threefold meaning "to our own soul," and im-
plies that the reason why Scripture has been endowed with 
this tri-level structure of meaning is to allow Scripture to 
correspond to the three parts of the human individual--not 
for the edification of three types of men. Nevertheless, 
Origen himself does apply this distinction of the three 
levels of meaning in Scripture for the benefit of three 
types of men. This ambiguity might be resolved, to some 
extent, by positing that the three types of men to whom 
Origen refers the specific levels of Scripture are divided 
into groups on the basis of which parts of the human indi-
vidual predominate in their characters. For example, if 
the concerns of the flesh occupy a given individual, then 
the "fleshly" meaning of Scripture would be the level most 
appropriate to such an individual's present condition, and 
Origen maintains that even this level of Scripture is able 
to lead the individual towards the spiritual level.22 
This adjustment in the interpretation of Origen 
implies that all three levels of meaning are valuable for 
all human individuals, but that one or another level is 
predominantly useful. For the advanced Christian, the spir-
11 
itual level would be of primary benefit, although even the 
obvious meaning of a given text would have some value. 
Thus, an exegesis of each level of meaning in Scripture 
would be appropriate in public discourse, regardless of the 
supposed "spirituality" of the audience. Origen includes 
an interpretation of all three levels of Scripture's meaning 
in both his homilies (which might be expected to have a 
broader, more general audience in mind) and in his commen-
taries (which might be expected to be addressed to the more 
advanced). Since Origen includes literal interpretations of 
Scripture in his more spiritual writings, and spiritual 
interpretations of Scripture in his more popular writings, 
he clearly believes that all the levels of meaning within 
Scripture are valuable for everyone. The fact that the 
obvious meaning almost invariably receives less attention, 
and Origen consistently urges his audience to advance beyond 
this level, need not be seen as contrary evidence. Origen 
is concerned with the spiritual progress of his audience, 
which would require a growing ability to perceive and ap-
preciate the deeper meanings of Scripture.23 
But even with this adjustment, the tri-level struc-
ture of the meaning of Scripture which Origen presents in De 
Principiis IV,2,4 contains a second ambiguity in regard to 
the relationship of these different levels to each other, 
and the presence of each level of meaning in every passage 
of Scripture. Modern scholars have frequently pointed to 
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the ambiguity of the level of meaning corresponding to the 
soul. This level seems to refer to the moral meaning of a 
scriptural passage, which would primarily apply to the im-
provement of the individual believer.24 But J.N.D. Kelly 
points out that in practice, Origen tends to employ an al-
ternate middle level of meaning in Scripture: the typo-
logical meaning, which would apply to the improvement of the 
Church as a whole.25 
But, as several scholars have pointed out, Origen 
does not consistently follow this tri-level theory in his 
own exegetical writings. Often, he simply distinguishes 
between the letter, or the obvious meaning, of Scripture 
(the body) and the higher meaning of Scripture (the spir-
it).26 Sometimes, Origen explicitly includes the moral 
level as one aspect of the spiritual level; sometimes the 
moral level is omitted altogether.27 On the other hand, 
the moral meaning may be the only "higher," spiritual mean-
ing which a passage contains. In one of his homilies, 
Origen argues that the moral meaning of Scripture sometimes 
has the highest meaning available to mankind, and no effort 
should be made to go beyond it.28 Yet in De Principiis, 
Origen declares that while not all of Scripture has meaning 
on the lowest level, all Scripture does have meaning on the 
highest level. So in some instances, the moral meaning is 
the spiritual meaning of a text. The result of this con-
fusion is that while the tri-level theory is an essential 
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aspect of Origen's over-all understanding of Scripture, his 
actual exegesis seems to depend upon a bi-level distinction 
between the "bodi 1 y, " or obvious, meaning of Scripture and 
the "spiritual" meaning of Scripture, which may include 
either a moral meaning, or an approximation of eternal/spir-
itual meaning, or both. 
Origen's understanding of Scripture (and the human 
person, and reality as a whole) is fundamentally dualistic. 
Origen adopts the Platonic distinction between the finite, 
imperfect, material and sensible world, and the infinite and 
perfect existence of ideas. The three levels which Origen 
postulates within Scripture are an attempt to distinguish 
between the partial experience of the ideal realm which man 
currently possesses, and the more complete and perfect ex-
perience of this realm which man once possessed, and is 
destined to regain. The distinction between the soul and 
the spirit is an attempt to maintain a spiritual element 
within every individual, while acknowledging that this spir-
itual element is not presently perfect. 
III. Origen's Exegesis: The Allegorical Method 
The rest of this chapter will examine how the "spir-
itual .. and "bodily" levels are related in Origen's exegesis, 
and how one moves from one level to the other. 
The language employed by Origen to distinguish be-
tween the two levels of meaning in Scripture--the spiritual 
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meaning and the bodily meaning--indicates something about 
the relationship between the two. Just as an individual's 
soul is "clothed" by the individual's body, the spiritual 
meaning of Scripture is clothed by the body of the text--and 
the bodily meaning of the text.29 One obvious result of 
this "clothing" is that the spiritual meaning is not immedi-
ately apparent in the text, any more than a human soul is 
visible in the human body. In this sense, at least, Origen 
speaks of the text of Scripture as "veiling" or concealing 
the spiritual sense.30 Therefore, Origen considers the 
spiritual sense to be hidden within the bodily meaning of 
the text of Scripture just as the human soul is hidden with-
in the body. 
The method which Origen employs to ascertain and 
interpret the hidden spiritual meaning within Scripture is 
allegory. If the spiritual meaning is hidden within the 
bodily meaning of Scripture, then the spiritual meaning must 
differ from the bodily meaning. Allegory refers both to the 
text which contains a hidden spiritual meaning, and to the 
technique which enables the exegete to move from the bodily 
meaning to the spiritual meaning.31 
If the spiritual meaning is completely unrelated to 
the bodily meaning, such an interpretation would be com-
pletely arbitrary. But Origen understands the two levels to 
be related: the body of Scripture is a "copy" or "shadow" 
of the spiritual meaning contained within it.32 In some 
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sense, the bodily meaning of a scriptural text symbolizes 
its spiritual meaning. Allegory is the method of inter-
pretation which reveals this hidden meaning of the symbols 
in the text.33 
But Scripture only hides the spiritual meaning of 
a passage so that the meaning might be communicated more 
effectively and appropriately. Origen asserts that an alle-
gory is a powerful means of conveying truth. "Clothing" 
the deeper meaning of Scripture in another, more obvious 
meaning incites the curiosity of the learned and compels 
the respect of the unlearned.34 The manner in which Origen 
extracts the spiritual meaning from an allegorical text 
directly corresponds to the manner in which he understands 
the text to contain and communicate the spiritual meaning. 
A close examination of Origen's exegetical techniques re-
veals the character of the relationship between the text 
and its underlying, spiritual meaning. 
Thus far, allegorical interpretation has been taken 
to refer to any kind of non-literal interpretation of the 
text. In the history of Christian exegesis, non-literal 
interpretations of the Bible have generally been one of two 
kinds: allegorical or typological. The distinction between 
these two forms of non-literal interpretation is not always 
clear in scholarly research, but R.P.C. Hanson's definitions 
of these terms are quite helpful. Typology is the inter-
preting of an event described in one passage of Scripture 
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as the fulfillment of a similar situation found in another 
scriptural passage. Allegory is interpreting a figure in 
a text (a person or event) as actually meaning something 
else.35 
Typology interprets a text by noting and explaining 
the similarities between the figure in one text, and another 
figure in another text. Thus, the serpent which Moses fash-
ioned and set upon a staff is a type of Christ: both the 
serpent and Christ were "lifted up" as God 1 s instrument 
for salvation. The elaboration of the similarities between 
Christ and the serpent is the task of typological inter-
pretation. The characteristics of one are used to explain 
the implied characteristics of the other. Thus, typological 
interpretation examines two similar texts in light of each 
other. 
Allegorical interpretation, on the other hand, at-
tempts to move between two levels of meaning within a single 
text. Allegory may refer to other scriptural texts in order 
to establish the correspondence between the two levels of 
meaning by identifying a common symbolism used throughout 
Scripture. But the texts are not taken as referring to each 
other, as in typological interpretation. In allegory, the 
correspondence between the figure found in the bodily mean-
ing and the spiritual meaning of the text often relies upon 
the consistent use of a specific symbol in Scripture. 
When Origen explains his allegorical method, he 
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uses the example of Scripture•s habitual use of Israel and 
Jerusalem as symbols of a specific kind of spiritual exist-
ence. Origen establishes that Scripture consistently uses 
Israel and Jerusalem to refer to a heavenly existence by 
adducing various passages where this symbolism is explicit 
(e.g., Gal. 4:26). He then applies this symbolism to vari-
ous texts in which Jerusalem and/or Israel appear, and even 
to texts which refer to other nations and cities, where such 
references either are not or cannot be literally true.36 
In this description of his allegorical method, 
Origen does not make a detailed comparison of two or more 
texts which contain references to Jerusalem. Nor does he 
elaborately describe the characteristics of the earthly 
Jerusalem which make it an appropriate symbol for a heavenly 
existence. The primary thrust of his argument is that this 
symbolism is used in various texts, and he shows how this 
symbolism leads to a proper spiritual interpretation of 
these texts. The intrinsic similarity between the symbol 
(e.g., Jerusalem) and what is symbolized (e.g., heavenly 
existence), is not explored in any detail, and often appears 
to be a very tenuous similarity. 
In Origen•s allegorical method, such intrinsic simi-
larity between the bodily meaning and the spiritual meaning 
must be tenuous. The spiritual meaning of Scripture is 
intended to communicate divine, eternal truths, and such 
truths could not possess the same similarity with the fig-
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ures which represent them that two similar earthly figures 
might possess. This very fact is one reason why Origen 
tends to devalue typology. Although he uses typological 
interpretations in his exegesis, Origen perceives this tech-
nique as producing information about non-spiritual matters, 
and therefore typology is not an adequate technique for 
ascertaining the spiritual meaning of Scripture.37 
But if some sort of intrinsic similarity between the 
spiritual meaning and the bodily meaning of the text which 
"clothes" it is ruled out by the nature of the spiritual 
meaning, is there any correspondence between the text and 
the allegorical interpretation, outside of the interpreter's 
imagination? Many scholars deny that any such connection 
exists.38 But Origen calls the bodily sense of Scripture a 
"shadow" or "copy" of the spiritual sense, so he apparently 
conceives of some such connection. The manner in which 
Origen develops his allegorical interpretations also indi-
cates that the relationship between the text and the alle-
gory interpreting it are not solely dependent upon his own 
fancy. 
In his commentaries, Origen's first exegetical move 
is to establish the text and its literal (or "proper") mean-
ing.39 The pains which Origen takes to achieve this purpose 
involves considerable erudition. Origen employs sophisti-
cated literary analysis, including lexicography, etymology 
and careful consideration of the context of a given pas-
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sage, in his effort to reveal the bodily sense of the text. 
Origen is acutely aware that even the literal meaning of a 
given passage is not always obvious.40 The care and skill 
which Origen brings to this task justify Trigg's assessment 
that he is "one of the greatest interpreters of the Bible on 
the literal level in the early Church."41 
Origen's assertion that the simple believer can 
benefit from the bodily meaning of Scripture cannot suffi-
ciently account for the effort which Origen expends in ex-
plaining the literal meaning of a text, especially if Origen 
simply intends to abandon this meaning once it has been 
ascertained. Undeniably, Origen considers it necessary 
to move beyond the literal meaning; but the care with which 
he establishes the literal meaning is evidence that such a 
move depends upon a careful and complete understanding of 
the bodily meaning of the text. Origen's subsequent exe-
gesis indicates the nature of this dependence. 
Having ascertained the proper literal interpreta-
tion, Origen insists that the "exact reader" should 
carefully investigate how far the literal meaning is 
true and how far it is impossible, and to the utmost 
of his power trace out from the use of similar expres-
sions the meaning scattered everywhere throughout the 
scriptures of that which when taken literally is 
impossible.42 
This passage provides the key to Origen's allegorical method 
and the way he thinks the text of Scripture corresponds to 
the spiritual meaning of Scripture. Origen's maxim that 
"all of Scripture has a spiritual meaning, but not all of 
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Scripture has a literal meaning" must be understood within 
the context of this passage.43 The literal meaning of 
Scripture is, by and large, accurate and authoritative.44 
But on occasion, the literal meaning of a scriptural passage 
will be false: either impossible or absurd, or simply in-
accurate.45 These occasions of error within the literal 
sense of the text are not accidental; they accord with God's 
over-all purpose for Scripture of leading mankind to divine 
truth, and are therefore spiritually true. God includes 
such "stumbling-blocks" within the literal meaning of cer-
tain scriptural texts to indicate the existence of the spir-
itual meaning of Scripture as a whole. Without such state-
ments, the reader would have no reason to look more careful-
ly into the text.46 
The occasional fallacies within the literal meaning 
of a specific text act as reminders that all Scripture has 
a spiritual meaning, and these fallacies also provide clues 
regarding what that spiritual meaning might be. But these 
clues are indirect. To correctly interpret the passage in 
question, Origen advises the exegete to identify the liter-
ally false statements within a passage and then to "trace 
out the use of similar expressions" in the rest of Scrip-
ture. The way such expressions are used in other passages 
of Scripture may shed light upon the spiritual meaning which 
these expressions are intended to indicate in the text in 
question. 
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Many scholars have pointed out Origen•s habit of 
associating key words and concepts of a scriptural text 
with other occurrences of the same words and concepts else-
where in Scripture.47 The fact that Origen•s allegories 
tend to arise in response to passages which Origen finds 
problematic is also well established.48 In the passage from 
De Principiis IV,3,5 quoted above, Origen explicitly links 
these two exegetical habits. Together they provide a method 
for ascertaining the spiritual meaning contained within a 
specific text. The fallacious statement discovered in a 
text is compared to similar instances of that statement 
found elsewhere in Scripture. The information obtained from 
this comparison points to the spiritually true meaning which 
the literally false statement is meant to convey. With 
this particular spiritual meaning as the key, the entire 
passage in which the original "stumbling-block" occurs can 
then be allegorically interpreted.49 
The connection between the spiritual meaning of 
Scripture and the text thus depends upon the passages of 
the text which are literally untrue, and the occurrence 
of similar passages in other parts of Scripture which indi-
cate the spiritual meaning of these literally untenable 
passages. The literal meaning of a text must be correctly 
ascertained in order to correctly identify the limits of 
that literal meaning. Where the literal meaning breaks 
down, the spiritual meaning is able to be perceived through 
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comparison with similar texts. When the 11 Stumbling-blocks" 
of a text have been spiritually interpreted in this fashion, 
the entire passage must be interpreted spiritually. Once he 
has correctly interpreted the specific symbols found within 
a problematic text, Origen allegorically interprets the 
entire passage which contains that text. The interpretation 
of the 11 Stumbling-block" invokes specific categories of the 
spiritual meaning of Scripture. Such an invocation brings 
all of the symbolic meanings and implications concerning 
spiritual truths in general into the interpretation of the 
entire passage which contains the stumbling-block. Thus, 
Origen constructs an integrated allegorical interpretation 
of an entire passage, based upon the symbolism contained 
within a literally false expression found in that passage, 
or carried over from another passage. 
IV. Conclusion 
From this examination of Origen's general under-
standing of Scripture, we have seen that Origen considers 
Scripture to be the means by which God leads man to a union 
with himself. This union is accomplished by man coming to 
perceive divine truth. Since Scripture is the divinely 
inspired medium of such truth, Scripture is trustworthy and 
authoritative. 
Nevertheless, Scripture by itself is not absolute. 
In order for Scripture to lead man to divine truth, it must 
be correctly interpreted. 
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The correct interpretation of 
Scripture requires that Scripture be interpreted as a whole, 
and each scriptural passage must be understood in the light 
of the rest of Scripture. 
Furthermore, the correct interpretation of Scripture 
requires the assistance of divine inspiration. In order for 
Scripture to be correctly understood, the same Spirit which 
inspired the scriptural author must also inspire the scrip-
tural exegete. This inspiration is necessary because scrip-
tural passages need to be interpreted in light of each oth-
er, and the Spirit enables the exegete to discern and apply 
the more general meaning of Scripture to the interpretation 
of a specific passage. 
But the assistance of the Spirit is also necessary 
because Scripture is written in human language, which is 
inherently incapable of adequately conveying the divine 
truth which it is meant to convey. Due to the frailty of 
human language, Scripture can only indicate or point to 
the divine truth which lies beyond it. The interpreter of 
Scripture can only discern this truth under the direction 
of the Spirit. 
Thus, Origen understands Scripture to consist of 
two levels: the "bodily" level, the literal or proper 
meaning of Scripture, and the "spiritual" level. Although 
Origen presents a theory which describes three levels of 
meaning within Scripture, which includes a "psychic" or 
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"soul" level of meaning between the bodily and spiritual 
levels, the practical application of his theory relies upon 
a bi-level understanding of Scripture. The intermediate, 
psychic level exists as a way of discussing the spiritual 
level of meaning in finite human terms. The level of mean-
ing which corresponds to the soul refers to the needs and 
circumstances of the spiritually immature or imperfect. 
Nevertheless, this level deals with spiritual concerns. 
The three levels of Origen's theory of Scripture 
are best identified as the bodily meaning of Scripture, 
the finite (or imperfect) spiritual meaning, and the infi-
nite (or perfect) spiritual meaning. Therefore, there are 
actually two levels of meaning within Scripture: the bod-
ily and the spiritual. But the spiritual meaning might be 
either finite and provisional, or infinite and perfect. 
Origen thinks that the relationship between the 
bodily and spiritual meanings of Scripture roughly corre-
sponds to the relationship between the human body and soul. 
The bodily meaning of Scripture "clothes"--and to some ex-
tent, therefore, conceals--the spiritual meaning. But this 
concealment is actually an effective form of communication. 
By being hidden within the bodily meaning of Scripture, the 
spiritual meaning acts as a lure to the curiosity of the 
learned, and inspires the respect of the unlearned. The 
concealment of the spiritual meaning is a more effective 
mode of communicating this meaning than an explicit state-
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ment of this deeper level of meaning. 
The bodily meaning of Scripture is able to point to 
and communicate the spiritual meaning through the errors 
which God incorporates in the bodily meaning. Impossibil-
ities, absurdities and non-factual aspects of the literal 
meaning of Scripture indicate the existence of the spiritual 
meaning. Furthermore, these flaws in the literal sense of 
Scripture provide clues about the content of the spiritual 
meaning. Other instances in Scripture where these same 
problematic passages occur establish a pattern of symbol-
ism which enables the correct spiritual interpretation of 
specific passages. This pattern of symbolism provides a 
bridgehead between the bodily meaning of Scripture and the 
spiritual meaning. Once the connection between these two 
levels of meaning has been established through the symbolism 
involved in a particular, literally non-factual passage, the 
entire text which contains this passage can be interpreted 
on the spiritual level. 
Origen•s overall understanding of Scripture provides 
a context within which his interpretations of the two stor-
ies of the creation of man can be discussed. The next chap-
ter of this thesis will examine these interpretations. 
CHAPTER II 
ORIGEM'S INTERPRETATIONS OF GEN 1:26-30 AND 
GEN 2:4-9 
Since Origen's Commentary on Genesis has been lost, 
the principal source for Origen's interpretation of the 
first creation of man story in Gen 1:26-30 is the last six 
chapters of his first Homily on Genesis, which deal directly 
with the interpretation of these verses. In his homilies, 
Origen is primarily concerned with the edification of the 
Church. Therefore, the Homilies tend to stress the spiritu-
al content of Scripture over the literal content, since an 
appreciation of the spiritual meaning of Scripture is an 
important advance in the spiritual life of the individual 
and the Church.! 
But Origen's first Homily on Genesis particularly 
tends to focus upon the moral aspects of this higher sense 
of Scripture. In this work, Origen is not primarily con-
cerned with presenting truths about the creation and ar-
rangement of the world; cosmology is not really an issue 
throughout the entire homily. Neither is the creation of 
man, in itself, a primary concern in this work. Instead, 
Origen wishes to discuss the 'moral psychology' implicit 
within the story of the creation of man.2 In other words, 
Origen is less interested in discussing the description of 
human nature embedded in the story of man's creation, and 
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far more interested in discussing the moral demands which 
are made upon man. Nevertheless, since the nature of the 
human individual in some sense determines the conduct proper 
to the individual, a great deal of Origen's anthropology is 
contained in the interpretation of Gen 1:26-30 found in the 
last part of his first Homily on Genesis. An implicit an-
thropology lies behind the explicitly moral allegory which 
Origen presents in this work. 
Just as the overall intention of the first Homily 
on Genesis colors the manner in which Origen interprets Gen 
1:26-30, and also the manner in which the anthropology im-
plicit in this interpretation may be extracted, so also do 
the contexts of Origen•s other works which contain an inter-
pretation of this passage color that interpretation. In 
each case, these contexts must be taken into account, in 
order to retrieve the anthropological implications contained 
within the exegesis. As a rule, the works which contain 
allusions to Gen 1:26-30, other than the first Homily on 
Genesis, actually interpret other scriptural passages. Con-
sistent with his overall exegetical method, Origen uses Gen 
1:26-30_to interpret other scriptural texts when a key word 
or phrase appears in both passages. Origen also uses this 
story of the creation of man to reinforce theological posi-
tions which he presents in his more theoretical work, De 
~rincipiis. Finally, Origen interprets both creation stor-
ies in the Contra Celsum, in which he is attempting to de-
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fend the legitimacy of the Jewish-Christian Scriptures, 
and their superiority over pagan writings. 
Fortunately, in each of these cases, the overall 
context leads Origen to emphasize the spiritual meaning of 
the texts with which he works, and this is precisely the 
level in which Origen finds and explains eternal truths--
such as the fundamental nature of man, man's relationship 
with God, and the doctrines of the Church concerning man's 
salvation. But since a scriptural passage can contain more 
than one spiritual meaning, different contexts will require 
that Origen interpret the same passage differently. 
The procedure followed in this chapter will attempt 
to accommodate this variation. First, Origen's exegesis of 
Gen 1:26-30 in his first Homily on Genesis will be present-
ed. Then the key anthropological points of this exegesis 
will be compared to the points made in the interpretations 
of this passage found in other works. An attempt will be 
made to identify the consistent features of Origen's exe-
gesis of this passage, and to place the variations of his 
interpretation within a coherent framework. A similar pro-
cedure will then be used in examining Origen's exegesis of 
Gen 2:4-9. 
I. Origen's First Homily on Genesis 
Origen begins his examination of Gen 1:26-30 in the 
last half of chapter 12 of his first Homily on Genesis. 
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The first half of this chapter focuses upon the 11dominion" 
which man is to exercise over the fish of the sea, the birds 
of heaven and the animals on the earth, and the whole earth 
itself. Origen has already discussed what these creatures 
symbolically represent. The water symbolizes man's mind; 
fish therefore represent affections and desires which arise 
from and move in the mind.3 Birds are heavenly impulses. 
Beasts and creeping creatures, which are brought forth from 
and move upon the earth, are carnal impulses; Origen con-
sistently interprets the earth itself as representing the 
body.4 Since man is given dominion over all these crea-
tures, Origen believes Gen 1:26 indicates that man's mind, 
which produces 11 according to the spiritual sense" and which 
is therefore the more divine aspect of man, should rule 
the body and all that 1 t produces "according to the carnal 
sense." God intends man's mind, and the spiritual impulses 
and desires which proceed from the mind, to rule and re-
strain man's carnal impulses and desires. 
In the last part of chapter 12 of his first Homily 
on Genesis, Origen turns his attention to the implications 
concerning man's place in the universe which the words "And 
God said, Let us make man ... " have. He notes that most of 
creation has been created at the command of God, that is, by 
God saying, "Let there be .... " But the first "elements" of 
the creation story, heaven and earth, the two great lights 
in the heavens and man are all described as being direct 
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works of God: Scripture has the first two described as 11 And 
God made ... 11 ; man's creation is narrated by "And God said, 
Let us make ..... and later, 11 And God made ... " For Origen, 
this similarity in the narrative indicates some kind of 
similarity between 11 the heaven and the earth 11 of Gen 1:1, 
the two great lights of Gen 1:16, and man, at least in terms 
of their prestige in the created order. Since these things 
are the direct works of God, and not just the result of his 
command, they have a somewhat higher position in the uni-
verse. Thus man is the equal of these other direct works 
of God, and is destined to share aspects of their relation-
ship to God. He is promised the kingdom of heaven, the 
inheritance of a good land, and the brilliance of the sun, 
when he has reached perfection.5 
Next, Origen tries to analyze who it is that is made 
in the image and likeness of God. Since God is not corpore-
al, it cannot be that corporeal man is made in God's image; 
the form of the body cannot contain the image of God. (An 
important aside indicates that corporeal man is the subject 
of Gen 2 : 4-9 : corporeal man is 11 formed 11 not 11 made. 11 ) In-
stead, Origen claims that it is our "inner, 11 incorporeal man 
that is made in the image of God. The possessive pronoun is 
important: one aspect of our human natures is the subject 
of Gen 1:26-30.6 This verse does not refer to another sort 
of human, but to one aspect of our own selves of which we 
may or may not be aware. 
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The 11 inner 11 man to which this verse refers is invis-
ible, incorporeal, incorruptible and immortal. These quali-
ties seem to be the sense in which the inner man is made in 
God's image. Since the inner man has these qualities, we 
know that it is the inner man that has been created in the 
image of God.? 
At this point, Origen rebukes those who think that 
God's image should be understood corporeally. Such an in-
terpretation involves an anthropomorphic understanding of 
God which Origen categorically rejects. God cannot be con-
ceived of in spatial or corporeal terms; therefore, God's 
image cannot be conceived of in these terms. 
Origen also rejects the concept of the "whole man 11 
being the image of God. Origen reemphasizes his understand-
ing of man as a composite creature; man is made up of vari-
ous hierarchically related parts. Man's spirit or mind 
is meant to rule his body. But Origen insists that we can-
not speak of different, unequal parts existing in God. It 
makes no sense to think of God as having one part which 
rules over another. Therefore, the composite nature of man, 
and the harmonious relationship between the different as-
pects of man's nature, is not the image of God which man 
possesses. Only the 11 inner man," the spirit or reason with-
in man can adequately reflect the simplicity of the divine 
nature, and therefore deserve the title 11 image of God ... 
In the course of this argument, Origen makes refer-
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ence to at least two, and possibly three types of men. He 
clearly indicates that there are those who are "citizens of 
heaven," the perfect. He makes an equally clear reference 
to those "involved in earthly details," who are far removed 
from God's influence, at least in terms of desire for God. 
But when Origen asserts that this latter type of man can be 
changed, he may indicate the existence of a third group: 
"those who have their treasures in heaven"--but who are not 
yet themselves citizens of heaven. 
The heart of Origen's exegesis of "And God said, Let 
us make man according to our image and likeness" focuses on 
the words "according," "likeness" and "image." He first 
asks what the image of God is, to which likeness man is to 
be formed. This question seems to indicate that "image" is 
not identical to "likeness" for Origen. Strictly speaking, 
the image is the model to which something is made similar; 
the likeness is the similarity to the model in what is made 
according to the model. 8 Using various citations, Origen 
asserts that the only image of God to which man could have 
been made similar is the Savior, Jesus Christ, the Word of 
God. Thus, from the very beginning, the "inner," spiritual 
man has a correspondence, a relationship with the Word, the 
Savior. 
This relationship predetermines the pattern of man's 
redemption. The fall was man's laying aside the image of 
the Savior, to adopt another image, that of the evil one. 
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Therefore, to save man, the Savior adopted the image of man. 
~ did so, due to his original, natural relationship with 
man; he did this, because this method corresponded to and 
reversed the pattern of the fall. The fall of man was ac-
complished by man's rejection of his similarity to the 
Logos. The redemption of man is accomplished by the Sav-
ior's reassertion of this similarity, through assuming human 
nature. The process of salvation is the process of renewing 
the image of the Savior in the inner man; being made simi-
lar, once again, to our original prototype. Likeness to the 
Savior is our natural condition; the image of the evil one 
is foreign to us by nature, but by "beholding the image of 
the dev i 1 , " we have adopted this image. But by beholding 
the image of God, man can be returned to likeness with the 
image of God, and this process is more sure, since this 
transformation is a return to what is natural for man.9 
Two significant implications are contained in this 
analysis of the human condition. The first is that the 
recovery process is more sure than the process of corrup-
tion, not only because the "model" (and in some sense, the 
agent) of recuperation is stronger than the "model" (and 
agent) of corruption--that is, the Savior is superior to 
the devil--but also because returning to what is natural is 
easier than abandoning what is natural. A second important 
implication is the role of "beholding" and contemplation in 
both the process of the fall and the process of salvation. 
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Origen does not explain this role, but in some way, contem-
plation connects the original and final states of man in 
both processes. 
Origen's consideration of the next verse is little 
more than a digression. He gives two different "literal" 
accounts of why, at this point in this creation story, 
Scripture records that God created man "male and female." 
The first reason is to provide a credible context for the 
blessing "increase and multiply." Without sexual differen-
tiation, this command is not believable, because the joining 
of the two sexes is the only way man knows of increasing and 
multiplying. Or it is possible that this verse aerely re-
flects the proper coordination of two related but dissimi-
lar elements which characterizes God's creation; everything 
which God creates is created in harmony and with an appro-
priate conjoining partner. Thus heaven and earth, and the 
sun and the moon (the other two examples of God's "own" 
creation) are paired in a kind of conjunction, and mankind 
should also involve a similar conjunction of male and fe-
male. But even so, this verse is recorded in "anticipa-
tion"; unlike the heaven and the earth, and the sun and 
the moon, man is not actually "conjoined" by the differen-
tiation of male and female until later, presumably after 
mankind is embodied.lO 
The second and spiritual meaning of this verse is 
more relevant to the anthropological view Origen seems to 
be establishing. 
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This verse indicates that the inner man, 
which is the aspect of human nature created in the image of 
God, consists of two hierarchically related parts, spirit 
(male) and soul (female).ll When these two parts are in 
accord, their union is "fruitful": they produce good incli-
nations according to the command to increase and multiply. 
More specifically, when these two elements of the inner man 
are in harmony, they are able to "fill the earth and have 
dominion over it ... As has been his practice throughout 
this homily, Origen takes "earth" to refer figuratively to 
the flesh, and the carnal desires that arise from the em-
bodiment of the inner man. When the inner man is in har-
mony, the flesh is properly subjected to the inner man, and 
the inclinations of the flesh are able to be turned to bet-
ter purposes. When the soul is in harmony with the spirit 
--and due to the hierarchical relationship which Origen 
seems to presuppose between the two, this means when the 
soul is obedient to, or aligned with, the spirit--then the 
flesh is obedient to the will of the spirit. 
But if the soul turns toward the flesh, and the de-
sires of the flesh, the union will be between the soul and 
the flesh, and this union is "adulterous" and unfruitful. 
Such a soul does not increase and multiply, but is condemned 
as a harlot. This is not a very explicit description of 
such a .. rebellious" or "adulterous" soul. The crucial ques-
tion is whether or not the soul is corrupted by this union 
with the flesh. 
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If it is, then only the spiritual part of 
the inner man is made in God's image, since this is the 
only incorruptible part of the inner man. If the soul is 
not corrupted by this union, it is unclear what damage, if 
any, has been done to the soul. It may be that the harm of 
such a union rests only with the "offspring": the inclina-
tions which such a union produces.12 These inclinations 
will be barren and unfruitful. The appropriate union be-
tween the soul and the spirit will not exist and therefore 
will not produce good inclinations. Neither the soul nor 
the spirit will have suffered damage to their essences, but 
their function of producing good inclinations will have been 
frustrated. 
The interpretation of Gen 1:28 focuses on desires 
and inclinations of the soul. The inner man is given domin-
ion over fish and birds, and animals and creeping things. 
Consistent with Origen•s established practice of interpret-
ing the upper waters as the mind (or the spirit), and earth 
as the flesh, the fish and birds symbolize rational and 
heavenly thoughts and inclinations; the animals and creeping 
things represent carnal desires and impulses. Apparently, 
all of these will exist regardless of the harmony or dishar-
mony of the spirit and the soul. But the "saints," those 
whose spirits rule their souls, and therefore also hold the 
flesh in subjection, have preserved God's blessing of having 
dominion over all such thoughts, inclinations, desires and 
impulses. 
43 
In the 1 i ves of the saints, "the whole man is 
guided by the will of the spirit. 11 In sinners, where the 
proper orientation of soul toward spirit is lost, the base 
and carnal impulses have dominion over the whole aan.13 
An interesting issue arising from all this is the 
role of the body. It does not seem to play an active role 
--and probably should not play any role at all, since the 
inner man in question in this entire exegesis is not yet 
embodied (unless we assume that all of this is also said 
11 in anticipation") .14 Yet there are carnal impulses and 
desires, apparently belonging to a disembodied soul. It is 
possible that Origen maintains that the soul has some sort 
of desire for the flesh (hence, "carnal desires"), but that 
these desires may have a part to play, or at least may be 
used, in the relationship of the spirit to the soul. But if 
the soul does not turn the desires to good use, but turns 
towards them instead, then eventually this inner man will be 
embodied. But it is not clear what sort of thing the soul 
is, which can have carnal desires without a body. 
As if in support of the odd theory that 11 carnal 11 de-
sires can contribute positively to the relationship of the 
soul to the spirit, and thus to the 11 inner man11 as a whole, 
Origen deals with the dietary arrangement of the first crea-
tion in an allegorical fashion which explains how this can 
be the case. Once again, the products of the earth (like 
all other things associated with the earth in the narrative) 
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is understood as being carnal. Thus the vegetation given to 
the inner man as food represents carnal desires, or bodily 
affections. These can be turned to good use, and such seems 
to be their original purpose. Origen uses positive instan-
ces of indignation and concupiscence, drawn from various 
scriptural passages, to reinforce this point. But such 
affections can be used against the will of the spirit, which 
is rational, and the irrational indulgence of these affec-
tions makes them 11 food for beasts 11 --that is, such a course 
encourages and reinforces the dominion of carnal desires 
over the sinning human individual. The fact that the narra-
tive has God giving these "plants" of bodily affections to 
man as food, but only observing that these same plants are 
food for beasts reinforces Origen's interpretation. God's 
command reveals God's intention for these affections; God's 
observation reflects God's judgment upon the misuse of these 
affections.15 
In his first Homily on Genesis, Origen draws three 
conclusions from his interpretation of Gen 1:26-30. First, 
he maintains that this passage witnesses to the fact that 
only the "inner man" has been made according to the image of 
God. Origen offers two proofs of this assertion. The inner 
man is incorporeal, immortal and incorruptible, and in this 
way the inner man is similar to God. No other aspect of the 
human individual can claim such similarity to God. God is 
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not corporeal, nor is God a composite being. So neither 
the body, which is corporeal, nor the whole man, which is 
composite, can be similar to God. 
Origen qualifies the similarity which exists between 
God and man by insisting that actually, man is similar to 
the Logos. The Word of God is the image of God, and man 
has been made according to this image. This is the second 
conclusion which Origen draws from his interpretation of Gen 
1:26-30. 
Finally, Origen turns his attention back to man's 
nature, and concludes that Gen 1:26-30 reveals the tripar-
tite character of man's nature, and the proper relation-
ship which these parts should have to each other. Man is 
composed of spirit, soul and body. Since the spirit is the 
highest aspect of man's nature, Origen concludes that man's 
spirit is the specific aspect which has been made according 
to the image of God. When the spirit rules over the soul, 
their union produces overall harmony within man. Man's 
body, and carnal desires, are dominated and turned to good 
use by this union. But if the soul turns to the body, the 
body and its desires and impulses will rule the soul and the 
spirit. 
These three conclusions are the basis for comparing 
Origen's other interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 with the in-
terpretation found in his first Homily on Genesis. 
II. Theological/Anthropological Aspects of Other 
Interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 
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Origen's exegesis of Gen 1:26-30 in his first Homily 
on Genesis clearly indicates that when Origen deals with 
this scriptural text, he believes that the relationship of 
the individual to God is the primary issue. But the text 
presents him with the problem of dealing with three distinct 
aspects of this relationship. These problematic aspects 
shape Origen's interpretations of this text found in his 
other writings as well. The problem is the question of how 
11 being made according to the image and likeness of God,. is 
to be interpreted. Clearly this phrase indicates some simi-
larity between the individual and God, but Origen feels ob-
liged to specify what sort of similarity this text implies. 
Does this similarity apply to the essences of God and the 
individual, or to their activities, or to their accidental 
characteristics? And what is the content of the similarity 
between God and the individual? In his first Homily on 
Genesis, Origen asserts that man is similar to God in the 
sense that both are immortal, invisible and incorruptible. 
But other interpretations present alternatives for the con-
tent of this similarity. When Origen interprets Gen 1:26 
30, questions of this sort tend to arise, and Origen's 
answers are not always the same in every case. 
A second problematic aspect of the relation between 
God and man which Origen finds in Gen 1:26-30 is the ques-
tion of the relationship between man and the Word of God 
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implied in this text. As we have seen in the first Homily 
on Genesis, Origen finds a reference to the Logos in this 
text in the phrase "image of God." The way man is related 
to the Logos is one link which Origen himself forges between 
the anthropology he finds expressed in Gen 1:26-30, and the 
soteriology which this anthropological view predetermines. 
Therefore, it is natural that the relationship between the 
Logos and man is a recurrent topic in Origen's interpreta-
tions of Gen 1:26-30. 
Finally, and most importantly in regard to Origen's 
theological anthropology, Origen attempts to interpret Gen 
1:26-30 in such a way as to discover what aspect of man is 
made according to the image and likeness of God. We have 
seen that Origen struggles with the question of how man is 
similar to God by discussing the possible characteristics 
which God and man have in common. But Origen also struggles 
with the question of what part of man bears this similarity 
with God. This latter question is the crucial anthropo-
logical point in Origen's interpretation of the creation of 
man stories. Origen tries to go beyond the content of the 
similarity between God and man to determine what aspect of 
man's nature is essentially divine. Of the three aspects of 
the God-man relationship which arise in Origen's interpreta-
tions of Gen 1:26-30, this topic occurs most often, and 
receives the greatest amount of attention. The importance 
which this topic has in Origen's interpretation of Gen 1:26-
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30 indicates that Origen finds this text a major source of 
information (or at least, of confirmation) for his theologi-
cal anthropology. 
Each of these problematic aspects, and the various 
ways Origen deals with them in his primary interpretations 
of Gen 1:26-30, will be examined in turn. Where Origen's 
interpretations differ in regard to each of these aspects, 
we will take careful note of the context of the various 
interpretations, and attempt to locate the reason for the 
variation. The first issue to be discussed is that of the 
nature of the similarity between God and man. 
A. The "Likeness" and the "Image" of God 
Origen's first step in describing the nature of 
the similarity between God and man in his first Homily on 
Genesis is to make a distinction between the "image" of God, 
and the "likeness" of God mentioned in Gen 1:26. As Origen 
presents it in this homily, the image of God is the Savior, 
the model or prototype according to which the inner man is 
made; the "likeness" simply refers to how the inner man is 
made according to the model. The sense is that Gen 1:26 
simply means "let us make man like the Savior, who is the 
image of God." 
Origen continues to be concerned about the distinc-
tion between the image and the likeness mentioned in Gen 
1:26, but the interpretation of this distinction varies. 
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At one point in De Principiis, Origen seems to think this 
distinction is a deliberate discrepancy in the scriptural 
text. While Gen 1:26 records God saying "Let us make man 
according to our own image and likeness," Gen 1:27 describes 
God as having made man "according to the image of God." 
The making of man according to God's likeness has not been 
recorded by Scripture, although Scripture "promises" it. 
Origen takes this to mean that being made according to God's 
likeness is a prophecy: this will be culmination of man's 
existence. The image of God has been given to the inner man 
from his first creation, but the likeness of God will be 
given to man as the reward and goal of achieving perfection. 
Origen construes "likeness" in this case as referring to 
something like an "image"--that is, a degree of similarity--
but a greater, more perfect similarity than an "image." The 
more perfect similarity is the end product of a perfected 
life.16 
Origen draws this same distinction between the "im-
age" and the "likeness" of God in Contra Celsum, but he 
is more specific about what constitutes a perfected life in 
this later work. Being made in the likeness of God is the 
result of leading a virtuous life; being made in God's image 
is something inherent to the human individual.17 The point 
of this citation in Origen's argument is that Christians do 
not believe that man, as he exists in this world, is in 
every way like God. Such perfect similitude with God be-
longs only to the perfected soul. 
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The image of God, which 
Christians believe every man to possess, does not involve 
such perfect similitude.lB 
Origen's distinction between the image of God which 
all living men possess, and the likeness to God which is the 
destiny of the perfect man, indicates that the similarity 
between God and man which is due to man being made accord-
ing to the image of God is not a complete similarity. By 
making this distinction, Origen places the living man at a 
distance from God in order to emphasize the closer similar-
ity of the perfected man with God. 
Origen also stresses the difference between the 
living man and God when he discusses why Scripture describes 
man as being made according to the image of God, and not as 
an image of God. As we have seen in his first Homily on 
Genesis, Origen tends to identify the Savior, the Word of 
God, as the image of God. Man is made according to this 
image. Therefore, man is not himself the image of God. The 
implication of this interpretation in regard to the rela-
tionship between man and the Logos will be discussed below. 
But this interpretation also has implications regarding the 
nature of the similarity between God the Father and man. 
Origen uses this text to stress both the relationship of man 
to the Logos, and also to emphasize that man is not similar 
to God in esssence. In Contra Celsum, this latter emphasis 
is more prominent, because Origen is attempting to discredit 
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celsus' criticism of Christianity's high regard for man. 
The occurrence of this same theme in other, less polemical, 
works indicates that Origen continues to insist on maintain-
ing a distinction between the nature of God and human na-
ture.l9 But Contra Celsum contains the most explicit de-
scription of the difference. As mentioned above, the simi-
larity between God and man is related to the possession and 
exercise of virtue. Origen interprets the fact that man has 
been made according to the image of God, and not made ~ an 
image of God, to indicate that while God possesses virtue 
by his very nature, man possesses virtue only in imitation 
of God.20 Being made according to God's image ensures man 
of the capacity for virtue; the actual acquisition and exer-
cise of virtue is not, however, guaranteed in man's nature. 
In a fragment of a lost work of Origen, the exercise 
of virtue is once again related to the phrase "the image of 
God." In this work, Origen uses this phrase to refer to the 
similarity between God and man. Man's capacity for virtue 
is the element in man's existence which is Godlike. God has 
made man like himself in order to enable man to act virtu-
ously. The capacity for virtue exists in man so that man 
will act virtuously and become even more Godlike.21 once 
again, the ability to act virtuously is part of the nature 
God has given to man. But the actual exercise of virtue is 
left for man to achieve on his own. 
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B. Man's Relationship to the Logos 
Although Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 
which have been examined have tended to stress the distance 
between God the Father and man, these interpretations have 
also emphasized the special relationship which exists be-
tween the Word of God and man. Origen habitually identi-
fies the Logos as the image of God, according to which man 
is made.22 This identification is natural, since Origen 
links the term "image of God" found in Genesis with Paul's 
assertion that the Christ is "the image of the invisible 
God."23 
Origen explicitly forges this link in De Principiis, 
as he attempts to explain the relationship between God the 
Father and the Logos. Origen explains that the word "image" 
has two distinct meanings in Scripture. "Image" may mean an 
object which has been crafted in such a way that it resem-
bles the original model. Origen maintains that this is the 
sense in which Gen 1:26-27 uses the term "image." On the 
other hand, the term may be applied to a child who possesses 
the same features and characteristics of his parents. The 
latter usage implies a unity of nature and substance between 
the image and the model according to which the image is 
formed. This is the sense the word image is used in Colos-
sians. But in regard to Gen 1:26-27, Origen implies that 
man does not share essentially in God's nature or substance. 
Origen describes the similarity to God found in man as a 
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crafted similarity, not an essential one.24 
In this passage, Origen maintains that the Logos 
possesses an essential similarity with God the Father. The 
relationship between the Logos and man is not discussed 
explicitly, but clearly the Logos possesses essentially what 
man possesses only derivatively. In this context, the Logos 
seems to be a model according to which man is created, just 
as Origen has asserted in his first Homily on Genesis. 
But in a later homily on Genesis, the relationship 
between man and the Logos is interpreted differently. In 
his thirteenth Homily on Genesis, Origen describes the Logos 
as the craftsman who creates the similarity to God, the 
image of God which is in man. The ambiguity which appears 
in Origen's first Homily on Genesis reappears here: the 
Logos is both the model for, and the agent who produces, the 
image of God in man.25 
A passage in Origen's Commentary on the Song of 
Songs also indicates that being made in the image of God 
implies a specific sort of relationship with the Logos, and 
this relationship influences the course of man's salvation. 
Since the soul has been created in the image of God, the 
soul receives its beauty by coming to the Word of God.26 
The relationship between the Logos and man in this instance 
is primarily that of a model to copy, but includes aspects 
of the Platonic theory of participation. Origen implies 
that by turning towards the Logos, man can come to share in 
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some quality of the Logos. This interpretation emphasizes 
the activity of man, i.e., turning towards the Logos, but 
the concept of a "copy" participating in its archetype, and 
thus sharing in some characteristics of the archetype has 
exerted an influence. 
In his Commentar~ on the Gospel of John, Origen 
tries to clarify what the image of God in man is, and how 
man is related to the Logos. The context for Origen's re-
marks is his argument advocating the acceptance of a modi-
fied "Euhemerism"--the idea that individuals may be "dei-
fied." Origen seems to assert that this can actually occur, 
but that it is the result of the one, true God bestowing 
divinity upon worthy individuals. 27 This process of "be-
stowing divinity" takes place in relation to the Word of 
God. The Word of God is the divinity of those who are made 
gods by the one God. Bestowing divinity means that God 
forms the "gods," in some way using himself as a model, and 
thus allows these "gods" to share in his divine essence. 
But the actual archetype for these images of God is the Word 
of God. To clarify the situation, Origen proposes a series 
of proportions. The faculty of reason in rational creatures 
is related to the Logos, just as the Logos is related to God 
the Father. Thus, just as the Logos is the image of God, 
reason in the human individual is the image of the Logos.28 
In his Commentary on the Gospel of John, Origen once 
again stresses that the Logos is the model for the divine 
quality in man. 
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But the proportions which he constructs 
also imply some sort of agency on the part of the Logos in 
establishing this divine quality in man. This work con-
tains another example of Origen's tendency to describe the 
relationship between the Logos and man as the relationship 
between a Platonic model or archetype, and a copy. Both 
similarity and derivation are aspects of this relationship. 
c. The Divine Aspect of Man 
The final ambiguity in reference to the general 
relationship between God and man which Origen finds in Gen 
1:26-30, and which he frequently addresses in his interpre-
tations of this passage, is the question of what part of 
man is the locus for the similarity between God and man. 
Origen's answer to this question varies in detail in his 
different interpretations, but Origen maintains one over-
riding point with great consistency. The inner, spiritual 
man is that aspect of the human individual who has been 
made according to the image of God. The corporeal aspect 
of the human individual is repeatedly excluded from sharing 
in the image of God. But there is some variation in the way 
Origen identifies what part of the inner man does share in 
this image. 
In his first Homily on Genesis, Origen asserts that 
the spirit is the aspect of the human individual which car-
ries a likeness to God, since only this aspect of the human 
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individual is immortal and incorruptible, just as God is 
immortal and incorruptible. In other interpretations of 
Genesis, Origen supposes that the virtues are the content 
of the similarity between God and man. This supposition 
influences Origen's proof that the inner man is the bearer 
of God's image in Contra Celsum. Here, Origen proves this 
assertion by eliminating the alternatives. Origen assumes 
that the human creature is made up of two parts: a body, 
and "the inner man," which seems to mean the soul. If the 
body is the part which is made in God's image, then the 
superior part of the human, the soul, is not made in God's 
image. In that case, the part of man made in God's image 
would be ruled by a part which is not in God's image, which 
is absurd. If both body and soul are that which has been 
made in God's image, then God must be a composite being, 
since a creature made according to his image is composite. 
This would imply that God had parts of varying degrees of 
superiority and inferiority; this is also absurd. There-
fore, it must be the soul, or the inner man, which has been 
made in God's image: there is no other alternative.29 
But in this same section of Contra Celsum, Origen 
also argues that the part of man which is made in the image 
of God is that part which has never had, or no longer has, 
anything to do with the "old man." Clearly, this is a 
reference to sinful man, the "old Adam." Origen's point 
seems to be that the part of man made in God's image cannot 
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have any necessary or inevitable connection with the sin-
ful life: if it has been in contact with sin, this contact 
is unnatural to it. But by implication, the parts of man 
which have not been made in the image of God do have some 
sort of inevitable connection with the sinful life. Since 
the inner, spiritual man is the only part which is free of 
a more or less necessary connection with sin, it is the part 
of man which has been made in God's image. 
A shift has occurred in Origen's understanding of 
the content of the similarity between God and man. In his 
first Homily on Genesis, Origen states that God and man are 
similar in that both are immortal, invisible and incorrupt-
ible. In Contra Celsum, Origen believes that God and man 
are similar in that both are free from a necessary connec-
tion with sin, and are therefore capable of maintaining 
virtue. In both cases, a key aspect of the similarity be-
tween God and man is stability or permanence. When the 
similarity is thought of as immortality, the permanent ex-
istence of God and man is stressed. When the content of 
the similarity is thought of as virtue, Origen's discussion 
dwells on the fact that both God and man (or at least that 
part of man whi,ch is similar to God) are capable of main-
taining virtue within themselves. Therefore, Origen implies 
that the similarity between God and man must itself exist in 
some permanent way. The image of God within man is stable 
and permanent because God himself is unchanging. The aspect 
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of man which possesses the image of God must also be perma-
nent and enduring, or else it would not be able to possess 
this image. 
The stability of the image of God in man is once 
again a primary issue in his thirteenth Homily on Genesis. 
once again, Origen stresses that it is the inner man who has 
been made in God's image, but he points out that this image 
cannot be "seen" when this inner man is "dirty," that is, 
when the inner man has assumed the image of earthliness, 
carnality. But the obscured image of God is not lost by 
this assumption of a contrary image. The image of God al-
ways remains in man, even if an earthly image is drawn over 
it.30 
But in other passages in which Origen interprets 
Gen 1:26-30, the damage which sin does to the image of God 
in man seems to go beyond obscuring this image. Origen's 
seventh Homily on Ezekiel describes the damage done to the 
inner man by inappropriate love as affecting the soul's 
"spirit-sense." Sinners fall in love with the soul in an 
inappropriate fashion, thus committing "spiritual impurity." 
This spiritual impurity injures the soul: its "spirit-
sense" is corrupted. At this point then, the spiritual 
sense of the soul, that aspect of the inner man which con-
tains the image of God, is corrupted.31 
The confusion concerning the stability of the divine 
aspect of man is related to Origen's inconsistency in iden-
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tifying what aspect of man is divine, i.e., capable of bear-
ing the image of God. Where the image of God in man is 
described as permanent and enduring, Origen tends to speak 
of the spirit of man as possessing the image of God.32 But 
in other interpretations, the broader term "inner man" is 
used to identify the locus of the image of God.33 
Origen presents us with a third alternative. In 
his Exhortation to Martyrdom, Origen identifies the soul as 
being that which is made according to the image of God. 
This is the reason why the soul is more precious than the 
body.34 This may be an instance where Origen is speaking 
loosely of the inner man as being simply the soul, rather 
than both the soul and the spirit. If this is the case, 
the interpretations where Origen identifies the soul as the 
bearer of God's image differ from other interpretations 
where the spirit bears this image in that the former inter-
pretations rely upon a bi-level anthropology, and the latter 
interpretations rely upon a tri-level anthropology. This 
same passage from the Exhortation to Martyrdom does include 
an implication that the soul can become something better 
than a soul--ie., a spirit--by suffering martyrdom. There-
fore, this passage seems to imply a modified tri-level an-
thropology. The soul is the condition of the spirit, where 
the spirit belongs to a living human being. In terms of the 
individual's present condition, there are two levels within 
the individual: the body and the soul, the outer man and 
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the inner man. But in terms of the individual's future, 
the soul is to be liberated from the flesh and become a 
spirit once again.35 
If this is how Origen's understands the human condi-
tion, then the variation in his interpretations of Gen 1:26-
30 is understandable. The "inner man," the spirit, and the 
soul all refer to the same entity, the spiritual aspect of 
man. Origen distinguishes between them in an attempt to 
communicate the difference between the spiritual capacity of 
the living man, and the spiritual capacity of the perfect 
man. When Origen speaks of the image of God residing in the 
spirit of man, his attention is focused on the final, per-
feet end of man's existence. When the soul is thought to 
bear the image of God, Origen emphasizes man's capacity to 
achieve this end. 
In addition, the question of the corruptibility of 
the divine aspect of the human individual is somewhat clari-
fied. The spirit itself is corruptible only insofar as it 
has become a soul, and may stay a soul for some time. But 
if the individual becomes enamoured of his current condition 
(thus falling in love with the soul), the influence of the 
soul's prior, strictly spiritual state will fade, and the 
return to this state will be hindered. 
III. The Second Story of the Creation of Man: 
Gen 2:4-9 
In his first Homily on Genesis, Origen only briefly 
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refers to the second story of the creation of man in Gen 
2:4-9. This second creation story receives much less atten-
tion than the first story of the creation of man in Gen 
1:26-30 in all of Origen's writings. When Origen does in-
terpret the second story of the creation of man, the re-
sults are in many ways the same as when he interprets the 
first story. His interpretations of Gen 2:4-9 vary depend-
ing upon the context in which the interpretations occur. 
Certain characteristics of Origen's theological anthropology 
appear in his interpretations of both stories. Neverthe-
less, Origen's interpretations of Gen 2:4-9 tend to deal 
with certain aspects of the human person which are not dealt 
with in his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30; other aspects 
of the human person are described differently. The most 
important aspect of Origen's interpretation of this second 
creation story is his discussion of the corporeality of 
human existence. 
As mentioned briefly above, Origen identifies the 
second creation of man story found in Gen 2:4-9 as a de-
scription of the corporeal creation of man in his first 
Homily on Genesis.36 This corporeal creation is not exam-
ined in any detail in this homily. Corporeality is not 
a primary concern in Origen's analysis of the human person. 
The primary concern of this homily is the discussion of 
man's moral obligations; Origen does not consider corporeal-
ity to be an important factor in this determination. Since 
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man's essence is spirit, man's primary duty is to the spir-
itual realm. 
In the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song of 
Songs, Origen presents his most extensive interpretation of 
Gen 2:4-9. In this interpretation, Origen explicitly states 
that the two creation stories, Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9, 
refer to the creation of two "different" men. Gen 1:26-30 
describes the creation of the inner man according to the 
image and likeness of God; Gen 2:4-9 describes the creation 
of the outer man, formed from the dust of the earth. The 
inner man is spiritual; the outer man is corporeal. But as 
Origen's references to Paul make clear, Origen actually 
thinks these creation stories describe the origins and char-
acteristics of two aspects of the human individual, rather 
than two types of men. Origen refers to Paul's statement 
that every person is made up of two different men, the inner 
man and the outer man. Each aspect has been created apart 
from the other, but is currently found in every human 1ndi-
vidual.37 Origen does not explicitly describe the manner in 
which these two distinct aspects have been united, nor the 
reason for this union. But since the outer man is explicit-
ly identified as having been "formed from the dust of the 
earth," it is reasonable to suppose that Origen understands 
"God breathing into the face" of the corporeal man as the 
means by which God unites the inner and the outer man. 
But even though Origen stresses the distinction 
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between the inner and outer man, which are united to form a 
given human individual, this is not the primary focus of his 
interpretation in the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song 
of Songs. Origen is more concerned with discussing the 
similarities between the two distinct aspects of the human 
individual which Scripture identifies as the inner and outer 
man. These similarities are extensive enough that Origen 
feels justified in using a common vocabulary in regard to 
each one. 
Both the inner, spiritual man and the outer, cor-
poreal man have "ages"; both the spirit and the body tend 
to develop in some kind of predictable pattern. Further-
more, both the inner man and the outer man can love. The 
corporeal aspect of man is capable of loving, and this love 
may be appropriate or inappropriate. In the same way, the 
spiritual aspect of man is capable of a different type of 
love--a spiritual love--and this type of love also may be 
appropriate or inappropriate. The exploration of love ap-
propriate to the inner, spiritual man is the subject of 
Origen's Commentary on the Song of Songs. 
In this interpretation of Gen 2:4-9, Origen argues 
that knowledge of the inner, spiritual man can be obtained 
by observing specific characteristics of the outer, corpore-
al man because the inner man shares some of these character-
istics, albeit in a spiritual manner. Origen argues that 
although the love proper to the corporeal aspect of the 
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individual may be a rival or alternative to the love appro-
priate to the spiritual aspect, this is not the only way for 
an individual to love inappropriately. Spiritual love it-
self may be appropriate or inappropriate. Origen maintains 
that by observing the rules which govern corporeal love, we 
learn about what is appropriate and inappropriate in spir-
itual love. Within the context of this argument, Origen's 
distinction between the spiritual and corporeal aspects of 
human existence does not emphasize the antagonism between 
the two; on the contrary, the similarities between the two 
aspects are emphasized.38 
In the Prologue to his Commentary on the Song of 
Songs, Origen interprets the second story of the creation of 
man as referring to the creation of the corporeal aspect of 
the human individual. It is no surprise, therefore, that 
the first clause of Gen 2:7 receives the most attention in 
this interpretation. Origen considers the fact that "the 
Lord God formed man of dust from the ground" as a clear 
indication that the corporeal creation of man is being dis-
cussed, as opposed to the earlier spiritual creation of 
man described in Gen 1:26-30. As we have seen in our analy-
sis of his first Homily on Genesis, Origen believes all 
scriptural references to the earth and ground are to be 
understood as allegorical references to man's body. 
But in Contra Celsum and De Principiis, when Origen 
interprets the second story of the creation of man, he fo-
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cuses upon the rest of Gen 2:7. The emphasis on the forma-
tion of man from the dust of the ground disappears. The 
fact that God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of 
life; and man became a living being., becomes the primary 
issue with which Origen is concerned. 
In Contra Celsum, Origen states that when God 
breathed into the face of the man formed from the dust (that 
is, the outer, corporeal aspect of man), God 11 imparted a 
share of his incorruptible spirit to man."39 Origen argues 
that this verse indicates that there is indeed an immortal 
and divine aspect of human existence. But in the course of 
this argument, Origen implies that the animating principle 
of man, that which makes man a living being, is this divine 
aspect. The spirit of man, which is itself a share of God's 
own spirit, is the animating principle of the human body. 
In this interpretation, Origen abandons his more usual tri-
partite anthropology in favor of a strictly dualistic an-
thropology. The spirit of man is invested with the function 
of the soul, as that which makes man alive. The fact that 
man is alive is taken as an indication that every man has a 
share in God's spirit. 
In De Principiis, Origen presents a similar inter-
pretation of Gen 2:7 as one possibility. Origen suggests 
that the breath of life might be understood as the gift of 
life, which God has given to all men. If this interpreta-
tion is accepted, Gen 2:7 indicates that every man has a 
share in God. 
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But in presenting this possibility, Origen 
does not identify this "share'' in God as part of God's spir-
it. If the breath of God is to be understood as the spirit 
of God, i.e. the Holy Spirit, then Origen suggests that this 
verse figuratively describes the inspiration of the pro-
phets, and the writers and interpreters of Scripture. In 
this case, Gen 2:7b simply indicates that God's spirit is 
given to the saints; the topic of the creation of man has 
disappeared.40 
IV. Conclusion 
This analysis of Origen's interpretations has been 
organized under the rubric of three anthropological ques-
tions which Origen addresses in these interpretations. 
While Origen does not answer these questions in the same way 
in every case, some kind of pattern may be discerned in his 
various responses. 
In his attempt to specify the content of the simi-
larity between God and man, his attempt to discern how much 
and in what way man is similar to God, Origen adopts one of 
two strategies. He either emphasizes a distinction between 
the image of God (which man currently possesses) and the 
likeness of God (which man will possess when he is perfect); 
or he emphasizes that man is made according to the image of 
God and not as an image of God. In both cases, Origen wants 
to stress that the current similarity between God and man is 
limited. 
67 
In the latter case, the distinction between being 
made according to the image of God and not as an image of 
God is made with the intent of avoiding an anthropomorphic 
idea of God; Origen wants to refute Celsus' accusation that 
Christians present a negative view of the divine since they 
consider man to be "just like God." In the former case, 
Origen distinguishes between the limited similarity with God 
which man currently possesses (the "image" of God) and the 
far greater similarity with God which the perfected man will 
possess (the "likeness'' of God). In both cases, the result 
of Origen 1 s interpretations stress a distance between God 
and man as he currently exists. 
The second anthropological aspect found in Origen's 
interpretations of the creation of man stories reemphasizes 
the distance between God and man. Origen describes the 
Logos as the intermediary between God and man. Most often, 
the Logos acts as the model after which man has been 
formed. The Logos is himself the image of God, according to 
which man has been made. But frequently Origen describes 
the Logos as a more active intermediary between God and 
man: the Logos is the craftsman who establishes and renews 
the similarity between God and man. 
The distance between God and man is accented by the 
mediation of the Logos in both cases. In conceiving the 
kogos as the model for man, Origen implies that man is not 
directly similar to God, but to the Logos. Man's similarity 
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to God is proportional to the similarity of the Logos to 
God. In conceiving the Logos as the craftsman of the simi-
larity between God and man, Origen stresses the fact that 
this similarity is derivative. Man possesses a crafted 
similarity with God, such as the similarity between a por-
trait and the individual which the portrait depicts, rather 
than similarity in substance and essences, such as the simi-
larity between a child and his parents. 
But even as he tends to emphasize the distance be-
tween God and man, Origen insists that man does possess 
some kind of divine nature. He attempts to identify exactly 
what part of man's nature is divine. The corporeal, carnal 
aspect of man is repeatedly dismissed from consideration, 
since God cannot be considered corporeal. But although 
Origen consistently identifies the "inner man" as the locus 
of the divine nature in man, he is not consistent in his 
more precise terminology. Usually, the spirit is the aspect 
of man which carries within it similarity with God; some-
times the soul bears this honor. 
This inconsistency may simply be symptomatic of 
Origen's tendency to describe existence as having three 
levels, while implicitly using a dualistic world view. 
Origen's distinction between body, soul and spirit is made 
within a Platonic understanding of reality, which distin-
guishes between the sensible and the ideal planes of exist-
ence. Before the implications which this tri-level/bi-level 
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theory has for Origen's interpretations of the creation of 
man stories, and for his theological anthropology, can be 
examined, we must first identify the sources of and influ-
ences upon Origen's interpretations. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SOURCES OF ORIGEN 1 S INTERPRETATIONS 
The analysis of Origen•s interpretation of Gen 1:26-
27 and Gen 2:6-7 in the previous chapter has provided the 
bulk of raw material which we will need to explore the theo-
logical anthropology, and its correlative soteriology, which 
Origen finds implicit in these creation of man stories. But 
before we can proceed with this exploration, our analysis of 
Origen•s own interpretations must be augmented by an analy-
sis of the various influences on Origen•s interpretations of 
Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7. 
As we examine the various influences which help 
shape Origen•s interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, 
we will obtain valuable, and sometimes vital, information 
which will assist our understanding of Origen. By identify-
ing the traditional elements in Origen•s interpretations, 
the elements which Origen has taken up from the biblical 
exegetes who preceded him, we will be able to see the unique 
aspects of Origen•s work. This contrast will be heightened 
by noticing what traditional elements Origen omits from his 
interpretations, and what traditional interpretations he 
feels obliged to refute. 
A second benefit of analyzing the influences upon 
Origen•s interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 also 
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involves contrast. 
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The inclusion of traditional elements 
brings a tone and perspective into Origen's work which is 
distinct from Origen's own. By identifying the occasions 
when Origen uses another exegete's work, we will be able to 
account for different nuances within Origen's writing with-
out losing sight of Origen's own position. 
Finally, Origen's interpretations sometimes include 
the assumption that his audience is as familiar with his 
predecessors as he is. At such times, Origen's interpreta-
tions may seem inconsistent or inexplicable because he fails 
to include all of the logical connections found in these 
sources; he simply uses their conclusions. In these cases, 
an understanding of Origen's sources is essential for under-
standing Origen. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to catalog and 
analyze all the various strands of tradition which Origen 
employs in his exegetical work, and all the influences which 
help shape his interpretations. This chapter will focus on 
the specific influences which affect Origen's interpreta-
tions of the two stories of the creation of man, and which 
can shed light on the theological anthropology that Origen 
discovers within these passages of Scripture. Therefore, 
this chapter will examine the influence which Clement of 
Alexandria and Philo of Alexandria have had on Origen's 
interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7. 
Evidence exists which establishes that each of these 
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exegetes has influenced Origen's interpretation of the crea-
tion of man stories. Each of these exegetes has written 
a significant body of work, from which their own philosophi-
cal predispositions and theological positions can be deter-
mined. Therefore, it will be possib~e to explore both the 
exegetical traditions which Origen adopts from these two 
authors, and their philosophical and theological presupposi-
tions which he inherits, and sometimes adapts. From this, 
we may obtain a clearer understanding of Origen's own philo-
sophical understanding and theological agenda. 
Special attention will be paid to the influence 
which Philo of Alexandria has had on Origen's interpreta-
tions of the two creation of man stor~es. Philo's influence 
on Origen seems to have been especially extensive. Philo 
and Origen share a common philosoph~cal orientation. But 
more importantly, each of these interpreters of Scripture 
works from a different theological tradition. Therefore, 
even though they both interpret the same Scripture, and use 
similar vocabulary and philosophical categories in describ-
ing the theological anthropology they find implicit in the 
two stories of the creation of man, they necessarily differ 
in the content of that theological anthropology. By identi-
fying and examining the adjustments which Origen makes to 
Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, and 
where Origen departs from Philo's interpretations altogeth-
er, we may be able to discern the aspects of Origen's theo-
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logical anthropology which are specifically related to his 
understanding of the Incarnation and Christian soteriology. 
This chapter will begin with an examination of the 
influence which Clement of Alexandria's interpretations of 
Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 has had on Origen•s interpreta-
tions. Clement shares Origen•s cultural and philosophical 
milieu, and Origen•s Christian theological orientation. 
Clement also has been influenced by Philo, and it is possi-
ble that some of Philo's influence on Origen has been com-
municated--and thus affected--by Clement.1 But the largest 
part of this chapter will discuss the influence of Philo on 
Origen•s interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7. This 
discussion will begin with an examination of the specific 
Philonic interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 which 
appear in Origen's exegesis of the two creation of man sto-
ries. Then Origen•s implicit use of Philonic interpreta-
tions will be examined in an effort to resolve certain in-
consistencies in Origen's interpretations. Finally, the 
differences between the interpretations of Origen and Philo 
will be identified. 
I. The Influence of Clement of Alexandria 
As soon as we begin to investigate the influence 
which Clement of Alexandria has had on Origen, we become 
involved in controversy. Some scholars, relying upon 
Eusebius• account of Origen•s life, assume that Clement 
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actually instructed Origen.2 But F. L. cross doubts whether 
origen has been influenced at all by Clement.3 Many modern 
scholars concede that while there is no evidence that Origen 
had been taught by Clement, there is sufficient evidence to 
suppose that Origen has been influenced by Clement's work.4 
The extent of this influence is still disputed. 
Fortunately, this thesis does not depend upon a 
resolution of this question. We do not need to predetermine 
the degree to which Clement has influenced Origen. Our task 
is to identify the instances where Clement interprets Gen 
1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, and determine if Origen uses these 
interpretations in his exegesis of the stories of man's 
creation and his theological speculations which arise from 
his exegesis. We may assume that Origen has some degree of 
familiarity with Clement's work, but we must also examine 
the relevant passages of Clement and Origen to determine how 
much this familiarity has influenced Origen's interpretation 
of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7.5 
When Clement interprets Gen 1:26-27, he usually is 
concerned with discussing the moral obligation man has to 
imitate God. He often connects this discussion of the imi-
tation of God with passages from the Greek philosophers 
which describe likeness with God in terms of justice, wisdom 
and virtue.6 Clement has been heavily influenced by, and 
often employs, the Platonic understanding of "likeness" to 
God as the essence of a virtuous and happy life. Clement 
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tends to interpret the statement that man has been made 
according to the image and likeness of God as a moral direc-
tive (e.g. , • man should act in imitation of God •) rather 
than as an anthropological description (e.g., •man is simi-
lar to God'). 
The emphasis upon the moral obligation imposed upon 
man is Gen 1:26-27 is also reflected in Clement's distinc-
tion between the 11 imagen and the 11 likeness 11 according to 
which man is created. Like Origen, Clement also states that 
what is 11 according to the imagen has been given to man at 
man's creation, but what is 11 according to the likeness .. is 
to be given as a result or reward of man•s living a virtuous 
life· 7 This particular distinction between 11 image" and 
11 likeness, 11 11 image 11 being part of man's original and present 
condition and "likeness .. being the future condition of the 
man who has led a virtuous life, fits in well with Clement's 
emphasis upon the moral implications of Gen 1:26-27. By 
describing the 11 likeness 11 of God as man's ~erfected state, 
Clement is able to describe and encourage the specific atti-
tudes and actions which bring man to this perfected state. 
But Clement uses the distinction between 11 image 11 as a pres-
ent condition and "likeness .. as a future condition only 
once. He makes other distinctions between the image and 
likeness of God alluded to in Gen 1:26-27 to describe the 
moral directives implicit in this creation story.S 
C 1 em en t combines his understanding that the 11 image 
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of God" which man possesses is not identical with the "like-
ness of God" with a discussion of man's relationship with 
the Logos. Clement makes the traditional exegetical move of 
identifying the true image of God as the Logos, and asserts 
that man is modeled after the Logos.9 But in two separate 
passages, Clement makes this move in connection with an 
explicit distinction between the "image of God" and the 
"likeness of God." When this occurs, his tendency to inter-
pret man's similarity to God as a moral dictum rather than 
an anthropological datum is again prominent. 
In the first of these passages (Strom. V,14), the 
combination of these two exegetical positions is straight-
forward. The "image of God" refers to the Logos, therefore 
man (specifically, man's mind) is the image of God's Image. 
But the "likeness" which man possesses is defined as a "di-
vine correspondence." To explain what this "divine corre-
spondence" is, Clement adduces scriptural passages describ-
ing man's obligation of obedience to God. The "likeness of 
God" which man possesses is therefore explained in terms of 
the imitation of God, but not in reference to man's perfect-
ed state. The distinction between the image and the like-
ness to God which are in man is no longer a distinction 
based on man's current state versus his future, perfected 
condition. Instead, this distinction is between the "image" 
as referring to a condition of man (being a copy of the 
Image of God), and the "likeness" which refers to an activi-
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ty required of man (the imitation of God).lO 
The second combination of the concept of the "image 
of God" as referring to the Logos, and the distinction be-
tween the "image of God" in man and the "likeness of God" 
is somewhat less clear. In The Paedagogue, Clement identi-
fies Christ (the Logos) as the maker and instructor of man, 
and as the one who effects man's salvation through his com-
ing. Christ forms man from the dust, then regenerates man, 
gives him growth by water and the spirit, and trains man to 
salvation. In this way, Christ transforms the earth-born 
man into a heavenly being. In being formed from the dust, 
man has been created according to Christ's image. But 
Christ's subsequent activity--the regeneration, growth and 
training of man--fulfills the Scripture "Let us make man 
according to our own image and likeness."ll 
Here again, "image" refers to the created condition 
of man; "likeness 11 is the result of Christ's saving work. 
The image of God is bestowed upon all men by-Christ when he 
creates them; the likeness of God is the result of Christ's 
example, his "training of man to salvation." Thus, the 
likeness of God comes after the image of God in temporal 
terms, but in this interpretation, it is not directly or 
exclusively the result of man's virtuous activity. Christ's 
activity is the central point of this interpretation. 
In this interpretation of Gen 1:26-27, Clement 
stresses the active role of Christ, the Logos, in man's 
re-creation, i.e., salvation. 
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This emphasis is combined 
with the concept of man being modeled after Christ, who is 
himself the Image of God. Here Clement shares Origen's 
concept of the Logos as both the model of man's creation, 
and the agent who effects man's creation.12 
Clement also includes a specific identification of 
the aspect of man which has been made according to God's 
image in some of his interpretations of Gen 1:26-27. This 
aspect is consistently identified as the mind, or the ra-
tional aspect of man.13 Since he identifies the mind as 
the divine aspect of man, Clement ascribes the title "Son 
of Mind" to the Logos, after whom man is modeled. Man's 
rationality is the result of man's similarity to the 
Logos.14 
The divinity of the rational aspect of man is also 
the main point of Clement's interpretations of Gen 2:6-7. 
Clement interprets these verses to show the dignity of man 
as a whole,15 but he often emphasizes the surpassing dignity 
of the part of man which God breathed into man's face.16 
Clement identifies this part as the rational soul.17 
Every time Clement interprets Gen 2:6-7, he includes 
an interpretation of Gen 1:26-27, which identifies the ra-
tional soul as the divine aspect of man. As Clement under-
stands these two stories of the creation of man, each one is 
primarily concerned with the nature and proper activity of 
the rational aspect of man.18 Clement makes very little 
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distinction between the two stories; both deal primarily 
with the mind of man. Clement does not encounter any diffi-
culty in interpreting Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 as different 
accounts of the same event. Clement never indicates that 
Gen 1:26-27 deals with an ideal or incorporeal creation 
while Gen 2:6-7 describes a corporeal creation. 
At this point, Clement's interpretation of Gen 1:26-
-27 and Gen 2:6-7 differs sharply from Origen•s. Origen 
insists on a sharp distinction between the two creation of 
man stories. Origen understands these two stories as de-
scribing two distinct events: the creation of 11 the inner 
man 11 and the creation of "the outer man. 11 This understand-
ing causes Origen to de-emphasize Gen 2:6-7, which he under-
stands as describing the corporeal creation of man. But 
when he does refer to Gen 2:6-7, the corporeal aspect of 
man is acknowledged. Clement understands both stories as 
referring primarily to man's inner, intellectual nature. 
From this brief survey of Clement•s·interpretations 
of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, we can identify other elements 
which also appear in Origen•s interpretation of these pas-
sages. First of all, the distinction between the image 
of God and the likeness of God which man possesses is promi-
nent in both authors• work. But the precise distinction 
which is important to Origen•s interpretation, the identifi-
cation of the image of God as a current possession of man 
and the likeness of God as a future result of living a vir-
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tuous life, appears only once in Clement. Clement has dif-
ferent ways of dealing with the difference between 11 image 11 
and 11 likeness, 11 combining this distinction with his under-
standing of the Logos as the image of God. 
This identification of the Logos as the image of 
God, and thus the model for the creation of man, is a second 
common point between Clement and Origen. At the same time, 
both authors agree that the Logos is also an active agent in 
the creation of man. This double concept of the Logos as 
the model and the agent of man's creation arises from a 
common philosophical perspective which both Clement and 
Origen share with Philo, and will be discussed in the last 
section of this chapter. 
A third characteristic common to Clement and Origen 
is that both authors link the role which the Logos plays in 
the creation of man with the role of the Logos in the salva-
tion of man. For Origen, this link is made in reference to 
the fact that man has been made according to the image of 
the Logos. Since man has been made similar to the Logos, 
the salvation of man is related to the re-establishment of 
this similarity. 
human nature.l9 
The Logos accomplishes this by assuming 
But Clement links the role of the Logos in the first 
creation story of man even more closely to the role of the 
Logos in man's salvation. He interprets the first creation 
story as containing a prophetic, allegorical description of 
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the salvation of man.20 The activity of the Logos in the 
creation and salvation of man has a special place in 
Clement's interpretation of Gen 1:26-27. The Logos brings 
about the salvation of man by training and enlightening 
man. Thus, Clement interprets Gen 1:26-27 in such a way to 
highlight the didactic element in the salvific activity of 
the Logos. 
Origen, on the other hand, uses his own interpreta-
tion of Gen 1:26-27 to stress that man's salvation depends 
upon the re-establishment of man's original similarity to 
the Logos. Undoubtably, a didactic element is a key part of 
this process. But Origen's imagery, which he develops in 
his exegesis of Gen 1:26-27, tends to emphasize a change in 
man's condition (as well as man's knowledge) as an important 
aspect of the saving work of the Logos. 
Finally, Clement consistently interprets Gen 1:26-27 
and Gen 2:6-7 as indicating that man's mind or reason is the 
aspect which is made according to the pattern of the Logos. 
Origen usually identifies this aspect as the spirit, soul or 
11 inner man. 11 While Origen is convinced that man's spirit 
includes or involves man's rational nature, he only infre-
quently identifies the spiritual aspect of man as the mind 
(nous) in his interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 
2:6-7.21 Even though Clement and Origen share an under-
standing of the divine aspect of man as being the highest 
• 
aspect of man's nature, reason, their vocabularies in dis-
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cussing the divine aspect in man differ significantly. 
From the above, we conclude that Clement and Origen 
share general concepts which undergird their interpretations 
of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7. But these two authors rarely 
deal with these texts in precisely the same way. Clement is 
oblivious to the exegetical problem which lies at the root 
of Origen•s interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7; 
Clement sees no need to interpret these texts as accounts of 
different events. He understands both creation of man sto-
ries as describing the intellectual, spiritual aspect of 
man • s existence. In this limited respect, Clement follows 
Philo in identifying man•s mind as the 11 true man. 11 22 
Origen, in contrast with Clement, draws a sharp 
distinction between the two creation of man stories, believ-
ing them to be descriptions of two different events. Origen 
thinks that Gen 2:6-7 is an account of the creation of the 
corporeal aspect of man, while Gen 1:26-27- describes the 
creation of man•s spiritual aspect. Origen is careful to 
distinguish between these two stories; Clement shows a 
strong tendency to conflate these two stories. Clearly, 
Clement does not have an extensive influence on the way 
Origen interprets these texts. 
Since both Clement and Origen deal with the same 
texts, and since both share a similar philosophical perspec-
tive, some similarities in their interpretations are to be 
expected. In addition, both authors draw upon the same body 
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of traditional exegesis to assist them in their interpreta-
tions. But Clement and Origen treat these elements which 
contribute to their interpretations in significantly differ-
ent ways. A comparison of the interpretations of Gen 1:26-
27 and Gen 2:6-7 found in Clement and Origen makes three 
aspects of Origen's exegesis stand out in sharp relief. 
First, Origen finds a sharp contrast between man as 
he currently exists and man as he will exist in his perfect-
ed condition in Gen 1:26, when God says 11 Let us make man 
according to our own image and likeness ... The 11 image of 
God 11 is bestowed upon man in creation, and is therefore an 
intrinsic property of man. The 11 likeness of God 11 is a more 
perfect similarity to God, which is the result of a virtuous 
life. Clement perceives this contrast, but does not empha-
size it. 
Secondly, while Clement emphasizes the didactic 
element of the saving work of the Logos, Origen includes an 
additional element in his understanding of this work. 
Origen's primary conception of the saving work of the Logos 
centers on the re-establishment of the original similarity 
between the Logos and man, which is described in Gen 
1:26-27. 
Finally, Origen's insistence that the two creation 
of man stories be treated as distinct events implies an 
interest in (or at least an acknowledgement of) man's corpo-
real aspect which is entirely missing in Clement. The only 
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aspect of man which Clement sees emphasized in Gen 1:26-27 
and Gen 2:6-7 is man's spiritual, rational aspect. Origen 
understands these stories as describing both the spiritual 
and corporeal aspects of man. 
One traditional source which Clement and Origen 
share is the exegetical work of Philo of Alexandria. We 
shall now turn to investigate Philo's interpretations of 
Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, and to explore the influence 
which these interpretations have had on Origen's exegesis 
of the creation of man stories. 
II. The Influence of Philo of Alexandria 
Origen cites Philo by name, so he must be aware of 
Philo's work.23 There is no controversy in scholarly cir-
cles about whether Philo has influenced Origen. Scholars 
disagree about the extent and content of this influence, but 
the fundamental question of the existence of this influence 
is not in question. For the purposes of this thesis, this 
solid conclusion is comforting but insufficient. The issue 
which must be addressed here is whether, and to what degree, 
Philo has influenced Origen's interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 
and Gen 2:6-7, and how Origen has adapted Philo's inter-
pretations. 
The resolution of this issue makes three important 
contributions to understanding Origen's exegesis of the 
creation of man stories in Genesis. The first advantage of 
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a clear understanding of Philo's influence on Origen's in-
terpretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 aay assist in 
the 11 rehabilitation 11 of Origen as an orthodox Christian 
theologian. Critics (and admirers) of Origen have pointed 
out that a good deal of Origen's soteriology relies upon a 
non-incarnational Logos theology.24 This criticism accu-
rately notes the prominence of the Logos as an intermediary 
between God and man in Origen's theological anthropology and 
consequent soteriology. But the role of Origen's inter-
pretation of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 in describing this 
intermediary function of the Logos is often neglected. 
As we shall see in the first part of this examina-
tion of Philo's influence on Origen, Origen draws heavily 
from Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 to 
develop his own Logos theology. But when Origen uses 
Philo's interpretations in his own work, he is using a non-
Christian source. This usage introduces an element which 
has no necessary connection with Christian doctrine, espe-
cially the doctrine of the Incarnation, into Origen's inter-
pretations. By identifying the instances where Origen is 
using Philonic interpretations, we will be able to identify 
aspects of Origen's exegesis which are non-Christian. 
The fact that Origen uses non-Christian elements to 
interpret Scripture and discuss Christian doctrine is not 
unorthodox or even unusual. Unless Origen neglects to in-
elude specifically Christian concepts in his work, the in-
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elusion of non-Christian concepts is not a flaw in his theo-
logical thought. Later on in this chapter, we will see 
that Origen does include specifically Christian, even spe-
cifically incarnational, aspects in his soteriology. 
The second advantage of reading Philo to understand 
Origen is that Philo sometimes clearly and explicitly estab-
lishes positions which Origen implicitly assumes. We will 
see that Origen is so familiar with Philo's work that he 
assumes his audience possesses the same familiarity. There-
fore, Origen feels free to leave logical gaps in his own 
writing when he thinks such gaps are adequately closed by 
Philo. This results in certain inconsistencies in Origen's 
interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1. An under-
standing of Philo resolves these inconsistencies into a 
more coherent form. 
Finally, a comparison of the interpretations of Gen 
1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1 found in Origen and Philo will iden-
tify the instances where Origen departs from Philo's posi-
tions. Such a comparison, like the comparison of Origen 
and Clement attempted above, will highlight the unique as-
pects of Origen•s interpretations of the creation of man 
stories. Even more importantly, Origen•s adaptations of 
Philo may be the result of Origen•s Christian perspective. 
By identifying these adaptations, we will be able to see the 
effect which Origen•s belief in the Incarnation has upon his 
interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1, and the theo-
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logical anthropology which he derives from these interpreta-
tions. 
A. Origen's Use of Philonic Interpretations 
As indicated above, Origen develops a great part 
of his Logos theology from his interpretations of Gen 1:26-
21. Origen understands these verses to indicate that the 
Logos is the image of God to which man has been made simi-
lar. Philo has had a tremendous influence on Origen's in-
terpretations of Gen 1:26-21, especially in regards to this 
identification of the Logos as the image of God.25 
We have seen that in his first Homily on Genesis, 
Origen makes this identification in the context of explain-
ing why Scripture records God saying 11 Let us make man ac-
cording to our own image and likeness." Origen infers from 
this text that "likeness" and "image 11 are not synonyms; 
Scripture does not contain idle repetitions. So Origen 
identifies the 11 image of God 11 as the Logos; the 11 likeness 11 
is the similarity to the Logos which God creates in man. 
This exposition is very similar to the one found in 
Philo's De Opificio Mundi, 11. In this interpretation, 
Philo also identifies the 11 image of God 11 as the Logos, and 
claims that Moses added the term "likeness 11 to indicate the 
exact similarity to the Logos which is characteristic of 
man. Thus, Philo also interprets Gen 1:26-21 as indicating 
that man has been made as a precise imitation of the 
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Logos.26 
The extent of verbal agreement is significant in 
this case. While it is theoretically possible that Origen 
may have reached the conclusion that the Logos is the image 
of God based on his reading of Paul's letter to the 
Colossians,27 apart from Philo's influence, the pattern of 
Origen's argument is so similar to Philo's that some influ-
ence by Philo in this case must be acknowledged. At the 
very least, we may suppose that Origen uses a Philonic argu-
ment to support this identification. It is more likely 
that Origen finds the identification of the Logos as the 
image of God in Philo, and uses it in his own exegesis to 
draw Colossians and other Pauline texts into his interpreta-
tions of Gen 1:26-27. 
In the course of adopting Philo's identification of 
the Logos as his own, Origen also adopts Philo's tendency to 
assert the significant difference between man and God which 
is implicit in this identification. Both Philo and Origen 
are careful to insist that the similarity between God and 
man is "at a third remove." Man is not really similar to 
God; man is similar to the Logos, who is similar to God. 
The desire to assert and emphasize the distance 
between God and man lies behind the similarity of Origen's 
interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 found in Contra Celsum, and 
Philo's interpretation of these verses in Heres. 231.28 In 
both interpretations, the identification of the Logos as the 
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image of God is followed by the conclusion that this is why 
Scripture asserts that man is made according to the image of 
God, not as an image of God. This interpretation of the 
preposition kata is sufficiently specific and idiosyncratic 
to infer that this is another case where Origen is explicit-
ly adopting Philo•s argument.29 
In the following chapter of this thesis, we will 
need to remember that these two important concepts from 
Origen•s interpretation of Gen 1:26-27--the identification 
of the Logos as the image of God, and the peculiar inter-
pretation of the preposition kata which emphasizes the dis-
tance between God and man--are derived from a non-Christian 
source. If Origen•s theological anthropology and consequent 
soteriology are related to his interpretations of Gen 1:26-
27 and Gen 2:6-7, we should not be surprised if some aspects 
of Origen•s anthropology and soteriology have a non-Chris-
tian character. The aspects of Origen•s Logos theology 
discussed above are Philonic rather than Christian. 
B. Origen and Implicit Philonic Interpretations 
As we have seen in the preceding section, Origen 
takes up some elements of Philo 1 s interpretations of Gen 
1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 with very little adaptation. There 
are also instances in Origen•s exegesis where a Philonic 
interpretation has been influential, but is not explicitly 
included in Origen•s exposition. Instead, Origen simply 
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includes the conclusions of Philo's interpretation without 
providing the logical connections which Philo makes in de-
veloping the interpretation. In such cases, Origen's inter-
pretations seem inconsistent because the philosophical pre-
suppositions which inform the interpretations are not made 
explicit. These presuppositions are often made explicit in 
Philo, so an understanding of Philo is essential to a proper 
understanding of Origen. Such instances are usually cases 
where Origen simply assumes that his audience is aware of 
the background of an idea and feels no need to elaborate. 
Origen would not see this assumption as an advance upon 
Philo's thought, nor as a distortion of Philo's work. 
We have seen in the second chapter of this thesis 
that Origen alternates between describing the content of the 
similarity between God and man as being related to incor-
ruptibility and immortality, and as being related to 
virtue. Philo exhibits this same tendency to shift from 
conceiving the similarity of man to God in 'terms of incor-
ruptibility to terms of virtue. But Philo also indicates 
why this shift is justifiable. An examination of Philo's 
position helps clarify Origen's "inconsistency" when he 
identifies the characteristic which makes man like God as 
both immortality, and as the possession and exercise of 
virtue. 
In Legum Allegoriae I, Philo argues that Scripture 
presents descriptions of the creation of two different men: 
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a "heavenly," ideal man in Gen 1:26-27, and an earthly man, 
who is part of the sensible world, in Gen 2:6-7.30 In a 
detailed description of the creation of this second, earthly 
man, Philo points out that the mind of this man is also 
earthly, and therefore corruptible and mortal. Therefore, 
God breathes into the face of this man, granting a portion 
of divinity to him. Thus, God gives the earthly man the 
power of "true life." The mind of the earthly man becomes 
a soul endowed with true mind, and thus truly alive.31 At 
this point, Philo associates the divine breath with 
immortality. 
Later on in his exegesis, Philo addresses the ques-
tion of why God gave the divine breath to the earthly, infe-
rior man, and not to the heavenly, ideal man. God did not 
wish to create any soul which is devoid of virtue. If God 
had not granted a portion of divinity to the earthly man, 
his soul would be a soul without virtue. In addition to 
this, God wished to make obedience to his commands (i.e., 
virtuous behavior) a duty. God granted the "divine breath" 
to the earthly man to forestall the possibility of pleading 
ignorance as an excuse for disobedience. At this point in 
his exegesis, Philo identifies the "divine breath" with a 
concept or experience of virtue.32 
Origen also tends to slide between the identifi-
cation of virtue as the content of man's similarity to God, 
and the idea that man is like God inasmuch as man possesses 
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a soul or spirit that is incorruptible and immortal, just as 
God is incorruptible and immortal.33 Origen varies between 
these two theories in different interpretations of Gen 1:26-
27; Philo's shift occurs in a single interpretation which 
focuses on Gen 2:6-7. This fact makes it unlikely that 
Origen is simply adopting Philo's interpretation in this 
case. But it is likely that Origen is adopting Philo's 
"manner of speaking" about the similarity between God and 
man. Origen takes the idea that man is like God in terms 
of either immortality or virtue from Philo, and applies this 
idea to his own interpretation of Gen 1:26-27. 
But Origen does not make an explicit link between 
the immortality of the soul or spirit, and the capacity of 
the soul or spirit to exercise virtue. In his interpreta-
tions of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, Origen tends to stress 
one or the other, and this gives his interpretations the 
appearance of inconsistency in this regard. This shift 
in Origen's vocabulary is an indication that while Philo 
makes the link between virtue and immortality explicitly and 
deliberately, Origen simply assumes this link. The associ-
ation of these two concepts along Platonic lines--the theory 
that the contemplation and practice of virtue is the essence 
of, or the necessary condition for, eternal life--is an 
established part of Origen's intellectual equipment. Origen 
will stress whichever concept, immortality or virtue, which 
best serves his purpose in a given context. When Origen 
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asserts that only man's spirit is made according to the 
image of God, immortality and incorruptibility are his pri-
mary concerns. When Origen discusses the degree of differ-
ence between God and man (and between the present man, and 
the future, perfect man), he focuses upon the concept of 
virtue. The link between virtue and immortality has become 
a ready assumption in Origen's mind, and does not need to be 
made explicit or defended. Philo does make this connection 
explicit, and thus we have an idea of how they are linked in 
Origen's theory as well. 
A second example of Origen's tendency to include 
Philonic conclusions in his exegesis while omitting explicit 
support or explanation for these conclusions occurs when 
Origen discusses what aspect of man is similar to God. 
Philo consistently identifies this aspect as the mind (al-
though some confusion between the terms "mind" and "soul 11 
does appear in Philo).34 Philo identifies man's mind as the 
aspect of man which is similar to God; therefore, man's 
rationality is a quality involved in the similarity of man 
to God. This fits in nicely with Philo's discussion of 
virtue as the content of the similarity between God and 
man. For Middle Platonists, the practice of virtue is prac-
tically reducible to acting according to reason. 
But Origen does not speak of man's mind as the as-
pect of man which bears the image of God; he tends to use 
broader terms, such as man's spirit or soul or the 11 inner 
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man." By doing so, Origen derives two questions from what 
Philo has treated as a single issue. Origen separates the 
question of what aspect (the "inner man," the soul or the 
spirit) of man is similar to God from the question of how 
(through reason, virtue or immortality) man is similar to 
God. Of course, these two questions are closely related in 
Origen, but the relatively ambiguous terms which he uses to 
identify the divine aspect of man require that Origen be 
specific in identifying the quality or qualities which are 
common to God and man. In the course of making this clari-
fication, Origen seldom refers to man•s mind, or to ration-
ality as the common ground between God and man. 
Origen•s comparative silence in regard to the divine 
nature of man•s reason is not an indication that Origen has 
a more negative view of man•s reason than Philo or Clement. 
When Origen identifies the "inner man, 11 and not man•s mind, 
as the bearer of the image of God, he is not questioning but 
rather assuming the rationality of the "inner man." This is 
clear from the rare occasions when Origen draws the subject 
of mind into his discussion of the divine aspect of man. 
For example, in his Commentary on the Gospel of 
John, Origen attempts to clarify the relationship between 
God and the Logos, and man to the Logos, by presenting a 
proportion: man•s reason is related to the Logos in the 
same way that the Logos is related to God. The introduction 
of the term "reason 11 in regard to man is abrupt in this 
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passage; up to this point in his argument, Origen has been 
discussing the Logos as the 11 divini ty 11 which God bestows 
upon those men whom he wishes to make gods. But Origen 
wants to establish the connection between the reason in man 
(logos) and the Logos, the son of God.35 
Here Origen identifies man's rationality as the 
aspect which is divine. His argument assumes this identifi-
cation when he makes the abrupt shift from discussing the 
Logos as the divinity bestowed upon some men to discussing 
the relationship of reason to the Logos and the Logos to 
God. The shift is comprehensible when understood in the 
light of a Philonic understanding of the essential divinity 
of man's rationality. 
Origen uses the term "reason11 in this instance in 
much the same way that Philo uses the term "mind 11 (nous) 
in Legum Allegoriae.36 Philo and Origen are referring to 
the 11 true mind, 11 the exercise of reason accor~ing to heaven-
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ly or ideal principles. The rationality which contributes 
to simple existence, the exercise of the faculty which al-
lows man to distinguish and judge between sensations and 
desires, is not the issue under discussion. Philo makes 
his peculiar usage of this term clear by contrasting it to 
the "mind" which is common to man and all animals; but 
Origen simply assumes that the peculiarity of his usage is 
apparent. Furthermore, in the rest of his interpretations 
of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, Origen feels no need to speci-
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fically affirm the peculiar rationality proper to the 11 inner 
man." The fact that the inner man acts rationally is so 
obvious to Origen that he feels no need to discuss it. 
By reading Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 
and Gen 2:6-1 from a Philonic perspective, the logical gaps 
in these interpretations are bridged. Origen assumes the 
rationality of the divine aspect of man, just as he assumes 
a logical connection between virtue and immortality. But 
since the rationale of these assumptions is not spelled out 
in Origen's expositions, his interpretations seem inconsis-
tent at these points. Philo does indicate the rationale of 
identifying reason as the divine aspect of man, and of link-
ing virtue to immortality. Origen assumes that his audience 
is sufficiently aware of Philo's work that there is no need 
to repeat Philo's entire argument. Therefore, such a famil-
iarity with Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 
2:6-1 is essential for understanding Origen's interpreta-
tions of the same passages. 
C. Origen's Adaptations of Philonic Interpretations 
We have seen that Origen sometimes uses concepts 
which are found in Philo, but without making the implica-
tions or sources of these concepts explicit. By reading 
Philo's more self-conscious use of these concepts, we come 
to discover the implicit assumptions of Origen's work. But 
there are also instances where Origen deliberately moves 
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beyond the positions found in Philo. These are cases where 
we can determine how Origen differs from Philo in his under-
standing of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7. The specific modifi-
cation which Origen makes--the substitutions which he makes 
in arguing for the same point as Philo, the different con-
clusions which he draws using the same premises--may indi-
cate the specific areas of disagreement between the assump-
tions of these two exegetes. We may be able to trace these 
specific disagreements to the difference between their un-
derstanding of humanity, which arises from their differing 
perspectives of the solution to the human problem. 
For example, Origen does not follow Philo's argument 
in asserting that the whole man, man as a composite of spir-
itual and physical natures, is not the bearer of the simi-
larity to God indicated by Gen 1:26-27. Both Philo and 
Origen make this assertion, but each exegete bases this 
assertion on different arguments, and uses it for different 
purposes. 
When Philo insists that the composite man is not 
the bearer of God's image, he is drawing a sharp distinction 
between the man created in Gen 1:26-27 and the man created 
in Gen 2:6-7. The first story describes the creation of a 
heavenly man created according to the image of God. The 
second story describes an earthly man who is composed of 
two distinct natures: body and soul. this earthly man is 
described as a mixture, a composite being.37 Since he is a 
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composite being, the earthly man is in need of instruc-
tion.38 The heavenly man is the "true man," created accord-
ing to God's image, and such a man needs no instruction, nor 
does he have any share in corruptible substances.39 
Philo uses this assertion in different contexts. 
Sometimes he insists on an ontological difference between 
the heavenly man of Gen 1:26-21 and the earthly man of Gen 
2:6-1. Other times, Philo argues for the superiority and 
independence of man•s rational aspect, using this assertion 
as the basis of his argument. But in every case, Philo uses 
the assertion that the composite man is not made according 
to God's likeness to make a philosophical observation con-
cerning human nature. These anthropological assertions 
are supported by Philo's interpretation of Scripture, but 
they do not refer to, or rely upon, Philo's concept of God. 
Therefore, these anthropological assertions are not theo-
logical. 
Origen also insists that the composite nature of man 
does not possess any essential similarity to God. Origen•s 
argument differs from Philo's, however, in that Origen con-
sistently refers to the simple nature of God as the basis 
for his assertion. God is entirely simple; we cannot speak 
of God as having parts, especially hierarchically related 
parts. Since God is simple, whatever is made according to 
God's image must be simple. Therefore, man as a composite 
creature cannot bear God's image.40 
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Origen•s argument is essentially theological. 
Origen uses a theological axiom--an axiom concerning the 
nature of God--to make an anthropological assertion. In 
this instance, Origen•s line of argumentation differs signi-
ficantly from Philo's. 
Origen sometimes departs from Philo's exegetical 
technique as well as his argumentative technique. Such 
departures indicate fundamental differences in Origen's and 
Philo's interpretations. For instance, Philo usually inter-
prets Gen 1:26-27 in conjunction with Gen 2:6-7, often con-
trasting the two different men created in these passages. 
But Origen seldom links these two stories together, even for 
the purpose of contrast. Furthermore, although Philo has a 
tendency to emphasize the importance of the first creation 
story over the second,41 he still discusses the second crea-
tion story at great length. Origen emphasizes the first 
creation story to such an extent that he tends to treat the 
second creation story very briefly. References to Gen 2:6-7 
occur much less frequently in Origen's work than references 
to Gen 1:26-27. Origen follows Philo's example in this 
regard, but carries his emphasis of Gen 1:26-27 to a greater 
extreme. 
The reason why Origen is more willing than Philo to 
simply pass over the second creation story is that these two 
authors have significantly different opinions regarding the 
actual subjects of these stories. Although Philo relies 
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upon and communicates a varied tradition of interpretation 
in his exegesis of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, he himself 
insists that these two stories describe the creation of two 
different men.42 The heavenly or ideal man is created in 
Gen 1:26-27, and is identified as a member of the intellig-
ible realm. The earthly man, repeatedly described as being 
of a mixed nature, is created in Gen 2:6-7. This latter man 
is the first human being. Philo discusses both in his ef-
fort to derive a proper understanding of man, and a proper 
moral regimen for the individual man, from Scripture. 
In the course of his various interpretations of Gen 
1;26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, however, Philo also includes explana-
tions in which the two creation stories are conflated; he 
then proceeds to pry them apart. Origen has been influenced 
by these conflated interpretations as well as by Philo's 
explicit inclination to separate the two stories. As a 
result, Origen does not think that these creation stories 
depict the origins of two different aen, but rather the 
origins of two distinct aspects of man, which currently 
co-exist but which have been created separately, and are 
destined to be separated. 
Origen makes this position clear the Prologue to his 
Commentary on the Song of Songs.43 Here, Origen starts to 
assert that Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 describes the creation 
of two different men, but then adduces a passage from Paul 
to point out that these two "men" are found in every man. 
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Origen interprets Scripture as showing that the two aspects 
of human existence which these two "men" represent are dis-
tinct, and destined to be separated. But he also under-
stands both creation stories to refer to man as he presently 
exists. Thus, Origen can accept interpretations where the 
two creation stories appear to be conflated, since he under-
stands both stories to refer to the creation of man. But 
Origen insists on treating the two stories separately, be-
cause he wishes to emphasize the difference between the 
spiritual aspect of man, whose creation is described in Gen 
1:26-27, and the physical aspect of man, which is created in 
Gen 2:6-7. 
In making this argument, Origen insists that the two 
creation of man stories in Genesis describe the creation of 
two different aspects of man--figuratively, two different 
"men. 11 He refuses to give credence to the idea that the two 
stories refer to the same event.44 This point is essential 
to Origen's position, because this interpretation of Gen 
1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 occurs within the context of his Com-
mentary on the Song of Songs. 
The premise of this commentary is that the Song of 
Songs uses corporeal images to explore spiritual truths. 
This is a legitimate technique, in spite of the provocative 
imagery used in the Song of Songs, because the inner and the 
outer man are distinct from each other, but similar enough 
that a common vocabulary may be applied to both.45 If Gen 
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1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 describes the creation of only one 
man, than there is no distinction and no similarity. If 
this is the case, the Song of Songs, with its lush corporeal 
imagery, cannot be considered a wholesome, much less in-
spired, book. The argument that the Song of Songs can com-
municate spiritual truths through this imagery is elimi-
nated. So Origen must assert the existence of two distinct 
but similar aspects of man in order to interpret the Song of 
Songs allegorically. 
While Origen and Philo agree in emphasizing the 
importance of Gen 1:26-27 over Gen 2:6-7, some of the basic 
assumptions which underlie their interpretations are differ-
ent. Origen understands these two stories as referring to 
the creation of two aspects of man; Philo understands the 
stories as describing the creation of two different men. 
This difference has repercussions in many of the instances 
where Origen adopts Philo's exegetical vocabulary and tech-
niques. Both exegetes tend to contrast the earthly man with 
the spiritual man, the man described in Gen 1:26-27 with the 
one described in Gen 2:6-7. In making this contrast, both 
tend to employ a tripartite anthropology, which is funda-
mentally dualistic. The three aspects of the human nature 
which both exegetes assume are separates into two catego-
ries: the earthly and the spiritual. But there are signi-
ficant differences in the anthropologies which Origen and 
Philo adopt in their interpretations. 
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Philo tends to describe the three aspects of man's 
nature in terms from Plato's Timaeus. Man consists of three 
parts: the rational soul, the sensate soul, and the body 
and its organs of sensation.46 Philo's interpretations of 
Gen 2:6-7 emphasizes the distinction between the rational 
soul, which is of divine origin, and the sensate soul, which 
man shares with the beasts and which is a part of the earth-
ly man's carnal existence. In effect, Philo assumes that 
the spiritual aspect of man is simply unitary--it consists 
only of the divine element in man, reason.47 
Origen also employs a tripartite anthropology, which 
makes a dualistic distinction between the spiritual and 
carnal aspects of man's existence. But Origen's system 
distinguishes between the spirit and soul and body. Both 
man's spirit and soul are parts of the higher, spiritual 
aspect of human existence; only the body and its sensations 
and desires are part of the carnal aspect of man's exist-
ence. The animating principle of man, the soul, is treated 
with some ambiguity. Sometimes the soul is identified as 
the divine aspect within man; other times, it is distin-
guished from the truly divine aspect of man, the spirit. 
But in such cases, the soul is destined to cling to the 
spirit and become truly spiritual--and truly divine--
itself.48 So for Origen, the spiritual aspect of man has 
two parts, the spirit and the soul, and the carnal aspect is 
unitary. 
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This difference between Philo and Origen is related 
to their different perspectives of the "earthly" man, man as 
he currently exists.49 Philo interprets Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 
2:6-1 with the intention of discerning how the heavenly 
aspect of aan comes to exist in a mortal creature, and his 
interpretations tend to focus on how the earthly man can be 
as much like the ideal man as possible.50 But the primary 
use of his interpretations of Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1 is 
to show how the creation stories may be interpreted as sto-
ries about the individual human soul. In doing this, Philo 
emphasizes these stories as sources of information regarding 
what the soul is.51 Philo interprets these stories in order 
to establish an anthropological theory upon which a moral 
regimen may be based. 
Origen thinks the two creation of man stories refer 
to two aspects of man as he currently exists. In inter-
preting Gen 1:26-21 and Gen 2:6-1 in this fashion, Origen 
(like Philo) is primarily concerned with discovering how 
Scripture relates to the individual's situation. But for 
Origen, this process involves describing how the spiritual 
aspect may be nurtured and emphasized, since this is the 
immortal and divine aspect of man's existence. Origen in-
terprets these two stories in order to describe how the 
earthly man may become completely heavenly. His emphasis is 
more on the moral regimen which is implicit in the creation 
of man stories, than on directly describing the nature of 
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the soul as he finds it in Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7. 
Origen•s insistence that the two creation of man 
stories describe the creation of two different aspects of 
man, not the creation of two different men, is the primary 
area where Origen departs from Philo's exegesis of Gen 1:26-
27 and Gen 2:6-7. Nevertheless, Origen may be drawing 
upon Philo in making this assertion. At various points in 
his interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, Philo 
talks about the two different men as though they are types 
of men found in the world.52 
Origen justifies his exegetical theory by supposing 
that there are three types of men found in the world. But 
we have seen how these three types of men are distinguished 
from each other on the basis of what part of their human 
psyche predominates in them.53 For Origen, it is a short 
step from discussing types of men to discussing aspects of 
men, which are the source for distinguishing such classifi-
cations. This shift may occur in Origen•s reading of 
Philo. Origen reads Philo's assertion that Gen 1:26-27 and 
Gen 2:6-7 describes the creation of two different men, and 
agrees--but in the sense that these two men are paradigms of 
men who are characterized by one or the other aspect of 
man's existence. 
III. Conclusion 
From this analysis of the influence which Clement of 
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Alexandria and Philo of Alexandria have had on Origen's 
interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, we have ob-
tained a clearer understanding of these interpretations. 
Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-·7 differ 
from Clement's, and these differences highlight three as-
pects of Origen's understanding of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6--
7. First, Origen draws a sharp contrast between the condi-
tion of man as he currently exists, and man as he will exist 
in his perfected state. Secondly, Origen's soteriology 
places a special emphasis on the re-establishment of man's 
original similarity to the Logos. Finally, Origen acknowl-
edges a scriptural description of man's corporeal aspect, 
and thus puts himself in the position of needing to deal 
with this aspect. These three conclusions will be important 
to the exploration of Origen's theological anthropology and 
soteriology in the next chapter of this thesis. 
Our examination of Philo's influence on Origen's 
interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 has been even 
more fruitful in terms of providing information about 
Origen's theological anthropology and soteriology. We have 
seen that Origen's Logos theology comes from his adoption of 
certain Philonic interpretations of Gen 1:26-28; therefore 
we must anticipate a non-Christian element in Origen's Logos 
theology. We have also seen that Origen's odd shifts be-
tween identifying virtue and immortality as the content of 
the similarity between God and man are based upon a Philonic 
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perspective which relates virtue and immortality. Further-
more, Origen's understanding of the essential divinity of 
man's reason has been emphasized and clarified. 
The analysis of the instances where Origen departs 
from Philo's interpretations of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7 
has also provided valuable information. We have seen that 
Origen makes an effort to construct an explicitly theologi-
cal anthropology--an anthropology which is based on concepts 
of God and man's relationship to God. Origen also differs 
from Philo by insisting on an ontological relationship be-
tween the inner, spiritual man described in Gen 1:26-28 
and the outer, corporeal man described in Gen 2:6-7. For 
Origen, this relationship is not that of an archetype to an 
image; both "men" are aspects of each human individual. 
Furthermore, while these aspects are distinct, they are 
sufficiently alike that knowledge of one can be applied, 
with modifications, to the other. Therefore, Origen is able 
to find spiritual significance in the corporeal aspect of 
man. 
Finally, we have seen that Origen's tripartite an-
thropology, developed in the context of interpreting Gen 
1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7, is different from Philo's. Origen 
thinks man's spiritual aspect consists of two parts, a soul 
and a spirit. This concept is not Philonic. When Philo 
distinguishes man's rational soul from man's sensate soul, 
the latter is clearly a part of man's corporeal aspect. 
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origen's tripartite anthropology seems to be his own inven-
tion. 
Equipped with these conclusions, and the analysis of 
Origen's interpretations in chapter 2 of this thesis, we are 
prepared to explore Origen's theological anthropology and 
correlative soteriology as they are developed in relation to 
Origen's understanding of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:6-7. 
CHAPTER IV 
ORIGEN'S THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND 
INCARNATIONAL THEOLOGY 
Studies of Origen's theology tend to focus on the 
theories which Origen proposes in his writings, and the 
philosophical presuppositions which produce these theories. 
But Origen usually proposes these theories within the con-
text of interpreting Scripture. Origen's theological spec-
ulation occurs within the context of Biblical interpreta-
tion; his interpretation of specific passages of Scripture 
leads to specific theological theories. We can best under-
stand Origen's theoretical proposals through an examination 
of the scriptural interpretations which give rise to these 
proposals. 
This thesis is an examination of Origen's inter-
pretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 for the purposes of 
illuminating Origen's theological anthropology, incarna-
tional theology and soteriology. Because only these pas-
sages are under consideration, only the aspects of Origen's 
theology which arise in connection with these passages will 
be discussed. While his theological anthropology greatly 
depends on his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9, 
Origen develops his incarnational theology and soteriology 
through the interpretation of many different texts. There-
fore, many aspects of Origen's incarnational theology and 
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soteriology will be neglected in this chapter. The conclu-
sions of this chapter are only a partial contribution to the 
study of Origen's understanding of the saving work of the 
incarnate Logos. 
This chapter will begin with a summary of Origen's 
theological anthropology as he develops it in relation to 
his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9. We will 
pay close attention to the specific problem which Origen 
sees as man's principal affliction, and the general solution 
which this problem entails. 
Due to Origen's insistence that "the end be like the 
beginning,"1 the next step will be analysis of Origen's 
understanding of man's original condition, especially man's 
original relationship to the Logos. Since Origen thinks 
that man's original condition will be his final condition, 
this analysis will provide us with an understanding of what 
the saving work of Christ, the incarnate Logos, is to accom-
plish. Of course, since Origen believes that man's original 
condition was purely spiritual, without any corporeal as-
pect, this analysis will focus on the relationship of man as 
a pure spirit to the unincarnate Logos. 
Finally, we shall examine the specific solution 
which Origen juxtaposes to the human problem: the salvific 
work of Christ, the incarnate Logos. This examination will 
focus on the specific contribution of the Incarnation of the 
Logos to the salvation of man, as Origen describes it in his 
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interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9. Origen inter-
prets these passages in such a way that they not only refer 
to the problem inherent in the current human condition, but 
they also contain implicit or explicit indications of the 
saving work of Christ. 
I. Origen's Theological Anthropology: The Flaw in Man's 
Existence 
The key concepts of Origen's general understanding 
of man's fall are the pre-existence of souls, the punitive 
or remedial character of corporeality, and the soul's des-
tined return to its original state. All of these concepts 
are involved, explicitly or implicitly, in Origen's inter-
pretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 which we examined in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. Now we shall attempt to assemble 
these individual concepts into an organized theological 
anthropology. Such an anthropology is often best expressed 
through a narrative, rather than theoretically. 
Origen's "myth" of the fall, is the story through 
which he conveys his understanding of the problem with man-
kind in general. Origen's theological anthropology is based 
on his conviction that originally, human souls were not 
souls at all. What we now call human souls were originally 
created as pure spirits, pure intellects.2 They were part 
of the intellectual realm. These pure spirits were created 
without bodies, and were therefore intended to be incorrupt-
ible. Anything which exists without a body is not naturally 
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liable to corruption.3 But these pure spirits were created 
with free will and, by the disobedient exercise of the will, 
these spirits "fell away" from their original relationship 
with God.4 This "falling away" occurred through a defect in 
the love the created spirits came to have for God. As a 
result of their failure to love God, these pure spirits 
became different spiritual entities. The kind of spiritual 
entity which they became depended on the degree to which 
they failed to love God.5 
One group of spirits failed by loving God in an 
"intermediate" fashion--they did not lose their love for God 
altogether, but this love was "cooled." These spirits be-
came the spiritual entities which we now call human souls.6 
These souls are peculiar creatures. On the one hand, as we 
have seen from our examination of Origen's interpretations 
of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9, these souls are spiritual. 
They are linked (or, at least, they should be linked) to the 
spirit--the entity which the soul itself once was. Origen 
seems to think that this entity still exists as man's intel-
lect, the highest faculty of man's soul.? But because the 
intellect exists in the soul as only one faculty, rather 
than as an entity in its own right, its existence is im-
paired. 
On the other hand, souls are destined to be joined 
with corporeal bodies, and even before they are embodied, 
they have "carnal desires." 8 These desires, and the union 
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of souls with corporeal bodies, are meant to help souls 
return to their original, purely spiritual state.9 But a 
soul may misuse its embodiment, and regress in its efforts 
to return to the spiritual state.10 
An often neglected but central aspect of this de-
scription of the soul is the flawed spiritual nature of 
the soul. The soul exists as a "fallen" spirit. The imme-
diate consequence of this fall is a degradation in the spir-
itual order: a spirit becomes a soul. This soul is spirit-
ual and retains some contact with its original condition. 
But the soul is a flawed creature; it exists only because a 
spirit freely chose to love God defectively. 
Origen discusses the "fall" of the pure spirit, and 
its consequent existence as a soul, by referring to Gen 
1:26-27. The spirit was made according to the image of 
God. When the spirit falls and becomes a soul, this simi-
larity to God remains, although it may be obscured.11 
Therefore, Origen is able to say that the human soul is made 
according to the image of God, in regards to its highest 
faculty, reason. But the soul is not yet made in the like-
ness of God; this greater similarity to God is part of the 
soul's return to its original spiritual state.12 Before 
it can undertake the quest for this greater similarity, the 
soul must regain the clear "image of God" which it had be-
fore it fell and became a soul. It must remove the defacing 
"images" which hide the image of God. These "images" are 
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the result of the soul becoming entangled in the body and 
its carnal desires, which were intended to help the soul 
become a spirit again. Thus, before the soul can progress 
in its return to complete spirituality, it must purify it-
self from the body and its desires--even though God has 
given these to the soul in order to help the soul become 
a spirit. 
The incarnation of the soul is part of the spirit's 
punishment for making the choice to love God insufficiently. 
But this punishment is fundamentally remedial. God intends 
the union of the human soul to a human body to help the soul 
regain its original spiritual status. Origen does not think 
man's corporeal existence as such is part of the problem of 
man's existence; the embodiment of the human soul is part of 
God's solution to the human problem.l3 
Origen proposes a soteriology in which a flawed 
spiritual creature (the soul) requires the assistance of a 
lower type of existence (union with a corporeal body) in 
order to regain a higher state of existence (the soul's 
original spiritual existence). The soul is a spiritual 
entity, but it cannot regain its pure spiritual existence 
unless it is united with a body--which is much less spirit-
ual than the soul itself. The soul cannot simply "turn 
itself around" and return to its purely spiritual status. 
The soul must be joined to a body and "ricochet" from corpo-
real existence back to a purely spiritual existence. 
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If we recall the Platonic idea that the rational 
soul is subject to forgetfulness when it becomes embodied, 
we may be able to understand Origen's argument better. This 
idea is similar, but not identical, to Origen's understand-
ing of the condition of the soul. For Origen, the soul 
forgets its true nature in the process of becoming a soul. 
In its failure to love God appropriately, a pure spirit 
loses its sense of itself and becomes a soul. This soul 
cannot comprehend the spiritual realm directly, even though 
it is a spiritual entity. God joins this soul to a body so 
that the soul can regain its original condition. The body, 
and the entire corporeal creation, is similar to the spirit-
ual realm. The soul is able to comprehend the physical 
realm, and so the body and the entire physical universe is 
able to remind the soul of the spiritual realm. The body is 
able to remind the soul of its original spiritual existence, 
and thus help the soul recover its original condition. 
Origen does not speak in terms of reminding the soul 
of what it has forgotten. He describes the recovery process 
in terms of re-establishing the "image of God," the similar-
ity man has to God through being similar to the Logos, with-
in the soul. When this similarity is re-established, the 
soul will be a pure spirit once again.14 But even though 
the soul must be embodied to become a pure spirit once a-
gain, the body must be left behind when the soul reaches 
this goal. Pure spirits do not have a corporeal dimen-
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sion.15 
Thus, even though the embodiment of the human soul 
is the first step in the rehabilitation of the soul, a time 
will come when the soul must reject the body in order to 
continue on its return to its original state as a pure spir-
it or intellect. At some point, therefore, man's redemption 
must involve a rejection of the corporeal dimension.l6 But 
the soul may be reluctant to reject the corporeal dimen-
sion. As we indicated earlier, the soul's carnal desires, 
which were supposed to assist the soul's efforts to return 
to the spiritual state, may entangle the soul with the 
body. The soul may misuse its embodied existence, and thus 
experience the body as a hindrance to its return to the 
spiritual realm. By being entangled with a body, the soul 
becomes less and less aware of its true spiritual nature. 
This misuse of the body makes it more difficult for the soul 
to reject the body. The body becomes an impediment to the 
soul, even though it was given to the soul as a help. The 
body becomes a detriment when the soul fails to use it prop-
erly. Once again, the fault lies with the soul, not with 
the body itself. 
The problem which Origen perceives in the current 
human condition, then, is not that the soul has been joined 
with a body. Instead, the inherent problem in man's exist-
ence is that a purely spiritual entity has become a flawed 
spiritual entity--a soul. This flawed spiritual entity can 
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either improve its condition, by re-establishing its origi-
nal similarity to (and love for) God, or it can deteriorate 
still further by continued disobedience to God. This dete-
rioration does not involve a further degradation in the 
spiritual status of the soul: the soul remains a soul. 
But it does further diminish the spiritual quality of the 
soul. The soul becomes less aware and less responsive to 
its highest faculty, the mind or spirit.17 The soul further 
defaces the "image of God" which it still possesses. 
Origen perceives the return of the soul to its orig-
inal state as the solution to this problem within human 
existence. Using terms derived from his interpretations of 
Gen 1:26-27, Origen describes this return as having two 
steps. The first step is the re-establishment of the image 
of God within the soul. This image has never been complete-
ly lost, but it has been obscured or defaced. The first 
step is to remove the defacement, the "images" drawn over 
the image of God in the soul. The second step is the soul's 
gradual acquisition of the likeness of God, which is a more 
perfect similarity to God than is implied by "the image of 
God."18 
Because the original spiritual creation had a close 
relationship with the Logos, the rehabilitation of the soul 
and its return to its original state depend on the activity 
of the Logos. Origen describes both steps in the trans-
formation of the soul back into a spirit as occurring 
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through the agency of the Logos.19 But Origen describes the 
saving activity of the Logos in connection with the original 
relationship of the Logos as pure spirits. Salvation in-
volves the recovery of this relationship. Before we discuss 
the activity of the Logos in saving man, we must examine the 
goal of this activity: the recovery of the original rela-
tionship between man's spirit and the Logos. 
II. Man and the Unincarnate Logos 
From our analysis of Origen's interpretations of Gen 
1:26-27, we are acquainted with Origen's understanding of 
the Logos as a mediator between God and man. This under-
standing emphasizes the distance between God and man. Fol-
lowing Philo, Origen insists that man has not been made 
as an image of God, but according to the image of God.20 
This interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 indicates that the simi-
larity between God and man is not immediate, but only deriv-
ative. Man himself is not like God himself; man is like the 
image of God, the Logos. Of course, since the image of God 
is like God, man does possess some similarity to God. But 
man is at a third remove from God, with the image of God, 
the Logos, between God and man. 
This position has often been attributed to Origen's 
Middle Platonic perspective.21 The distance between the 
transcendent, unitary God and the multiplicity of creatures 
is an essential doctrine for this philosophical perspective. 
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Origen, as a Middle Platonist, would be obliged to stress 
the distance between the One and the many. 
But this interpretation of Gen 1:26-27 is not the 
result of Origen's attempt to force Scripture into agreement 
with his own philosophical perspective.22 On the contrary, 
Origen stresses the distance between God and man for theo-
logical reasons.23 In Contra Celsum, these reasons are 
primarily apologetic. Origen must refute Celsus' accusation 
that Christians have an unworthy concept of God since they 
believe that man is "just like" God, and man is manifestly 
wicked. Origen does not attempt to argue that man is suffi-
ciently good to merit comparison with God. Instead, he 
argues that Celsus has misunderstood Scripture and the 
Christian position. Christians do not believe that man, as 
he currently exists, is just like God. Christians believe 
that man has been created according to the image of God, and 
therefore man bears a more distant similarity to God.24 
Origen emphasizes the distance between God and man 
for other reasons than that of refuting the accusation that 
Christians have an unworthy concept of God. In his other 
writings, Origen interprets Gen 1:26-27 to stress this dis-
tance in order to set the stage for his understanding of 
the saving work of the Logos.25 In order to discern this 
soteriological element, we must recall Origen's understand-
ing of Scripture as a whole. We must also read these inter-
pretations in the light of Origen's distinction between 
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the image of God and the likeness of God. 
As we have seen in the first chapter of this thesis, 
Origen thinks Scripture has been given to fallen man for his 
salvation. Scripture is given to man in order to lead man 
back to God. Therefore, when Scripture describes man's 
creation, it is addressing fallen man. Is it possible that 
Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 is actually a description of the 
"creation" of fallen mah? This seems to be the case. 
Origen interprets Scripture as describing the creation of 
two aspects of man. This is why there are two descriptions 
of the creation of man. But Origen's understanding of man's 
original condition as a pure spirit cannot allow for dis-
tinct aspects within the original man: pure spirits cannot 
have such aspects. Therefore, when Scripture asserts that 
man has both spiritual and corporeal aspects, Scripture 
must be describing man as he currently exists. 
When Gen 1:26-27 describes the creation of man's 
spiritual aspect, Scripture indicates that this aspect in-
cludes a remnant of man's previous existence as a pure spir-
it. But the man described in both creation stories is man 
as he currently exists. Therefore, when Origen insists 
that the man (or the aspect of man} created in Gen 1:26-30 
is related to God in a derivative fashion, he is talking 
about man as he currently exists. 
When we recall Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-
27 which emphasize the distinction between the similarity to 
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God implied by the "image of God" and the "likeness of God" 
as a greater similarity to God which man must achieve, we 
can see the soteriological element implicit in the inter-
pretations which emphasize the distance between God and man 
by placing the Logos as intermediary between them. The man 
who is so distant from God is man as he currently exists. 
The perfected man will not only be more similar to the image 
of God {the Logos), he will also possess an actual likeness 
to God. The perfected man will have a relationship with God 
much like the relationship between the Logos and God.26 By 
emphasizing the distance between man as he currently exists 
and God, Origen emphasizes the difference between man as he 
currently exists (fallen man) and man in his perfected 
condition {redeemed man). 
This is why Origen insists the Logos is a necessary 
intermediary between fallen man and God. When man is per-
fected, his relationship with God will correspond to the 
relationship of the Logos to God.27 Since man's perfection 
is simply a return to man's original condition, man's origi-
nal creation--not the creation recounted in Gen 1:26-30 
and Gen 2:4-9, which describes the "creation" of fallen 
man--was as a pure spirit intimately related to God. Thus 
man's perfection consists of re-establishing this relation-
ship. 
The soteriological element of Origen's concept of 
the Logos as intermediary between God and man consists of 
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this insistence that fallen man must have his original simi-
larity with the Logos re-established. The original similar-
ity between "man"--i.e., the spiritual entity which became a 
human soul--and the Logos existed because the Logos was the 
agent and model for the creation of the spiritual realm.28 
But even though the purely spiritual realm is intimately 
related to the Logos, the agent and model of its creation, 
it is also intimately related to God the Father. In fact, 
because of its relationship with the Logos, the spiritual 
realm is related to God in a way which corresponds to the 
relationship of the Logos and God. Thus, the spiritual 
realm does not relate to God through the Logos so much as it 
relates to God in the same way as the Logos.29 The Logos 
functions as an intermediary in reference to fallen spirits 
(e.g., human souls). In reference to the pure spiritual 
realm, Origen de-emphasizes the role of ~~os as intermedi-
ary in favor of stressing the similarity between the Logos 
and pure spirits. 
The similarity between the Logos and pure spirits 
exists due to the role of the Logos in the creation of the 
spiritual realm. This has been observed by various critics 
of Origen as a defective element in Origen's christology and 
soteriology.30 The most intimate relationship with the 
Logos exists on a strictly spiritual plane, apart from the 
Incarnation of the Logos. This appears to imply that Origen 
does not consider the Incarnation to be a central element in 
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the relationship between God, the Logos and man. 
But it is important to note that the relationship of 
the Logos to spirits refers to the original spiritual realm 
--and therefore does not directly refer to "man" at all. 
This relationship does not exist between the Logos and the 
human soul, because the human soul is no longer a purely 
spiritual entity. In the original spiritual realm, there 
was no "spirit of man" distinguishable from other spirits. 
Diversity among spirits is the result of the disobedience of 
spirits, some of whom disobeyed in such a way that they 
became human souls and later embodied human souls.31 Thus, 
the relationship between the Logos and pure spirits does not 
directly apply to man, since the distinct creature "man" 
does not exist in the purely spiritual realm. A remnant of 
this relationship between the Logos and spirits exists be-
tween man and the Logos since man's rational and spiritual 
aspect is a remnant of his original, purely spiritual 
state. When man has been returned to his original state, he 
will once again share in this relationship of similarity to 
the Logos--but at this point, man will no longer be human. 
He will once again be a pure spirit. The unincarnate Logos 
is intimately related to such spirits. But since man is 
not a pure spirit, we cannot assert the existence of such a 
relationship between man and the unincarnate Logos. 
We have seen that while some similarity between man 
and the unincarnate Logos exists, man's salvation depends 
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upon the complete re-establishment of this similarity. 
Origen's thinks that only the incarnate Logos is able to 
re-establish the similarity between himself and man, and 
therefore the Incarnation is a key aspect of Origen's soter-
iology. 
III. The Incarnate Logos 
As we mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
Origen's understanding of the role played by the incarnate 
Logos has been discussed by scholars from various perspec-
tives. These various perspectives have produced a variety 
of models for the soteriological aspect of Origen's incarna-
tional theology. Many scholars believe that Origen's soter-
iology is primarily didactic, and attribute this to the 
influence of Clement of Alexandria.32 Others claim that the 
model of Christ vanquishing the powers of evil and freeing 
man from Satan predominates in Origen's soteriology.33 
Still others point to Origen's understanding of the Logos as 
an intermediary between the unity of God and the multiplic-
ity of creatures, and insist that Origen's concept of the 
Logos as possessing different manifestations (~inoiai) is 
the key to Origen's soteriology.34 
Danielou attempts to organize all of these elements 
into a soteriological system.35 He argues that Origen be-
lieves Christ, the incarnate Logos, defeats Satan and frees 
man, and then proceeds to teach man how to use his freedom 
to turn to God. 
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Christ is uniquely able to instruct man, 
because Christ is able to adapt himself to the capacities of 
each individual. This adaptability exists in Christ by 
means of the various manifestations which exist in Christ. 
Danielou's system includes the various elements of Origen's 
soteriology which appear in Origen's writings, but neglects 
the scriptural interpretations which produce and nuance 
these elements. In addition, the role played by the Incar-
nation in the salvation of man receives scant attention. 
Danielou is not the only author to downplay the 
role of the Incarnation in Origen's soteriology. Almost the 
only point where the secondary literature agrees about 
Origen's soteriology is in pointing out that the Incarnation 
does not play a central role in Origen's theological reflec-
tion on man's salvation.36 No one denies Origen's belief in 
the Incarnation; scholars agree that Origen believes in the 
historicity of the Incarnation, and gives it some role in 
his soteriological writings. But most scholars think Origen 
fails to explore the soteriological significance of the 
Incarnation to any great extent. The agreed upon conclusion 
is that Origen tends to stress the role of the unincarnate 
Logos to the neglect of the Incarnation, although scholars 
disagree about why this is the case.37 
Our examination of Origen's interpretations of Gen 
1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 does not resolve the confusion which 
exists concerning Origen's soteriology, but it does place 
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Origen's understanding of the soteriological significance of 
the Incarnation in a different light. The role of the In-
carnation in the salvation of man is emphasized and 
described, explicitly or implicitly, in many of Origen's 
interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9. 
Origen's first Homily on Genesis has been the key-
stone of our examination of these interpretations. In this 
homily, Origen uses Gen·1:26-27 to comment on the saving 
work of the Logos. The problem inherent in man's current 
existence is that man has "drawn over" or defaced the simi-
larity to the Logos which exists in his spiritual nature. 
This similarity must be re-established. The Logos accom-
plishes this by becoming man. In his first Homily on 
Genesis, Origen explicitly shows the Incarnation to be a key 
aspect in the redemption of man.38 
The description of the salvific effect of the Incar-
nation is less clear in this passage than the assertion 
that the Incarnation is salvifically effective. Since the 
Logos became man, all who come to the incarnate ~egos are 
made similar to him in proportion to their ability. Because 
the Logos became man, everyone who comes to him is made like 
the incarnate Logos. This establishes a new similarity 
between man and the Logos. Originally, spirits (who later 
became human souls) were 
man (an embodied soul) 
like th~ unincarnate Logos. Now, 
is made similar to the incarnate 
Logos. Through this new similarity, man will be able to 
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regain his original similarity to the Logos. 
Origen implies that man is able to move from this 
new similarity with the incarnate Logos back to his original 
similarity with the unincarnate Logos by contemplating the 
incarnate Logos. When the Logos became man, the body and 
soul of the Logos became divinized, i.e., made spiritua1.39 
Man is lead to a participation in the spiritual nature of 
the Logos by contemplating the divinized, incarnate nature 
of the Logos. Thus man can regain his own original spirit-
ual form, i.e., his original form as a spirit similar to the 
unincarnate Logos. 
The key to Origen's soteriology in connection with 
his interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 is his 
insistence on the need for establishing a new similarity 
between man and the Logos before the old similarity can be 
regained. The soul is unable to retrace its steps; it can-
not return directly to its original similarity to the 
Logos. The soul has defaced its similarity to the image of 
God to such an extent that the soul cannot recognize this 
image within itself. A new similarity between the soul and 
the image of God is necessary before the soul can perceive 
and renew the old similarity with the Logos. The Incarna-
tion of the Log~ establishes this new similarity.40 
In order to establish the new similarity between man 
and the Logos, the Logos must truly become man. For Origen, 
this means that Jesus Christ must have a spirit, soul and 
body as all men do.41 
128 
In the case of the Incarnation, 
Origen's tripartite anthropology leads him into difficulty. 
Origen understands man's soul to be a fallen and flawed 
spiritual entity. Man's spirit, the highest faculty of 
man's soul, is the remnant of the pure spiritual entity 
which the soul once was. The body is God's provision for 
the soul to lead it back to its spiritual nature. But the 
Logos is not the same thing as a pure spirit, even though 
pure spirits are like the Logos. Nor is the Logos such a 
thing as can "fall," become a soul and thus require a body 
to become purely spiritual again.42 Therefore, Origen po-
sits the existence of a particular spirit which did not 
fall when the rest of the spiritual realm fell (and became 
human souls or demons or whatever). This spirit was so 
attached to the Logos as to become one with the Logos. This 
spirit voluntarily became a soul and united with a body in 
order to accomplish the salvation of man.43 
The crucial issue in this theory of the Incarnation 
is the union of the Logos with the spirit which is to become 
the soul of Jesus Christ. The concept of this union makes 
Origen's incarnational theology somewhat clumsy, because 
there are four aspects of Jesus rather than three: the 
Logos, the spirit which is united with the Logos, the soul 
of Christ (which has the spirit united with the Logos as its 
highest faculty), and the body of Christ.44 
The concept of a spirit united with the Logos seems 
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superfluous as well as awkward. If a pure spirit can volun-
tarily accept degradation to the status of a soul,45 why 
can't the Logos, who is so similar to such spirits, do the 
same? This would eliminate the extra term in Origen's 
christological anthropology. Christ would be an embodied 
soul, like all mankind, but the highest faculty in this soul 
would be the Logos. 
Origen does seem to adopt this simpler incarnational 
theology on some occasions.46 But for the most part, he 
insists on the awkward inclusion of a distinct spirit which 
unites with the Logos. Apparently, Origen does not think 
that the similarity between pure spirits and the Logos is so 
great as to allow the Logos himself to be changed into a 
lower spiritual entity, the way pure spirits are changed 
when they become souls. Because Origen insists on this 
distinction between pure spirits and the Logos, in spite of 
his assertion that spirits are similar to the Logos, 
Origen's incarnational theology is awkward.47 Even when he 
speaks about the original relationship between created spir-
its and the Logos, Origen is careful to distinguish between 
the divine and non-divine spheres of existence. When he 
discusses the relationship between souls and the ~Qgos, this 
distinction is so important that Origen allows it to strain 
his incarnational theology. 
This theory of the Incarnation would not only be 
simpler than the one which Origen usually proposes, it would 
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be more convincing in regard to the Logos actually becoming 
man. As it stands, Origen's incarnational theology depends 
upon an intimate union of a spirit and the Logos. Unless 
these two are actually united, the Logos cannot be under-
stood as truly becoming man. Instead, a spirit who is 
closely connected with the Logos voluntarily becomes an 
embodied soul; no Incarnation of the Logos himself occurs. 
But Origen's soteriology requires the actual Incarnation of 
the Logos. Therefore, Origen insists on an actua~ union of 
a particular spirit and the Logos, and the subsequent volun-
tary degradation of that spirit to an impaired spiritual 
existence as a soul. 
IV. Conclusion 
The Incarnation is a crucial element in Origen's 
soteriology because of his understanding of man's fallen 
condition. The fall caused a pure spirit to become an im-
paired spiritual entity, a soul. A soul needs to be embod-
ied in order to be saved (i.e., to become a pure spirit 
again), because a soul cannot comprehend its original exist-
ence as a pure spirit. It needs to learn of the spiritual 
realm through a metaphor or simile. The body and the entire 
physical world acts as a metaphor of the spiritual order. 
The physical world is able to do this because it is similar 
to the spiritual order; because the body is less than the 
soul, the soul can comprehend the body, and so the metaphor 
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is available to the soul. 
But a soul is likely to misuse its embodied condi-
tion for the same reason that it needs to be embodied: the 
soul has lost its ability to perceive its highest faculty--
the spirit or reason--as its true self. Because it does 
not know its true nature, the soul may regard its current 
embodied condition as its true nature. When this happens, 
the soul becomes less and less aware of its original exist-
ence, its original relationship with God, and its original 
similarity to the Logos. 
In order to save this confused creature, the Logos 
becomes like the soul in its present condition. The Logos 
becomes incarnate. Since the incarnate Logos, Christ, is 
like the embodied soul, Christ is able to reveal to the soul 
its true spiritual character, and show the soul how to re-
gain this character. Christ illuminates the metaphor of 
corporeal existence for the soul, and points out to the soul 
the similarity between the physical realm and the spiritual 
realm. Christ is able to do this by revealing the divine, 
spiritual aspect of his own embodied condition. Since the 
embodied soul is similar to the embodied Christ, this simi-
larity enables the soul to perceive the spiritual, semi-di-
vine aspect of its own condition. This perception is the 
first step towards the salvation of the soul. 
For the soul to be saved, however, it must regain 
its original condition, its original similarity to the 
Logos, and its original relationship to God. 
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The teaching 
and example of Christ, the incarnate Logos, shows the soul 
how this can be done. Along the way, the soul will have to 
reject the body and the corporeal world. When the soul is 
mature, it must abandon the metaphor for the reality. When 
the corporeal world is abandoned completely, the soul will 
once again be a pure spirit. It will once again enjoy a 
relationship to God modeled after the relationship of the 
Logos to God. 
CONCLUSION 
In his comprehensive study on Origen, Danielou 
points out that Origen's 
position is the same whether the question at issue is the 
material side of worship, the literal meaning of Scrip-
ture or the visible humanity of Christ: he affirms the 
reality of all three, but at the same time he regards 
them only as starting points.1 
Our study of Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and 
Gen 2:4-9 supports Danielou's opinion, but it also reveals 
crucial nuances in Origen's attitude toward man's embodied 
condition. The literal meaning of Scripture, man's own 
embodied condition and the Incarnation of the Logos are all 
only "starting points" for Origen, and all are destined to 
be superceded by a stronger, more spiritual existence and 
knowledge. But all three are necessary starting points; 
they are the vehicles by which God returns the fallen soul 
to its higher spiritual existence. 
We began this study with an examination of Origen's 
exegetical method, in order to establish a context for ex-
amining Origen's interpretations of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 
2:4-9. Our examination of his exegetical method revealed 
Origen's somewhat paradoxical understanding of the "bodily" 
meaning of Scripture. On the one hand, Origen exerts tre-
mendous effort to establish the literal meaning of a scrip-
tural text. Origen insists that this level of meaning is 
beneficial, to some degree, for all Christians. 
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But on the other hand, all those who wish to advance 
in the spiritual life must move beyond the "bodily" meaning 
of the text, and discern the higher, spiritual truths which 
God wants Scripture to convey. Since the spiritual meaning 
of Scripture is the meaning which God primarily intends 
Scripture to communicate, we are obliged to go beyond the 
"bodily" meaning of the text in favor of the spiritual mean-
ing. 
The discernment of the spiritual meaning requires 
the use of allegorical interpretation. ~llegory enables the 
Christian to move beyond the literal meaning of the text and 
to perceive the spiritual meaning. But as Origen develops 
his allegorical method, we see that the "bodily" meaning of 
the text is the necessary medium for communicating the spir-
itual meaning. The Christian can discern the spiritual 
meaning of Scripture only by thoroughly understanding the 
literal level of meaning. 
A thorough understanding of the literal meaning of 
Scripture enables us to discern the inaccuracies and impos-
sibilities within this level of meaning. These stumbling-
blocks indicate the existence of another level of meaning 
within the text--otherwise, they would be proof that Scrip-
ture is unreliable. They are also the keys for discovering 
the content of this other level of meaning; the highest 
spiritual truths which Scripture contains. Without these 
stumbling-blocks, the highest and truest meaning of Scrip-
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ture would be inaccessible. The lowest level of meaning in 
Scripture, and the "weakest" aspects of this level--the 
inaccuracies in the literal meaning--must be surpassed in 
favor of higher truth. But these "weak" aspects of Scrip-
ture are the means by which God communicates the greatest 
truths to fallen man. 
Our examination of Origen's interpretations of Gen 
1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9, and the theological anthropology 
which he constructs from these interpretations, shows that 
Origen has a very similar understanding of man's current 
embodied condition. The body, and the entire corporeal 
realm, is weaker than the spiritual realm, and unable to 
achieve spiritual existence. Therefore, the body must be 
abandoned in the course of man's recovery of pure, spiritual 
existence. But the body is the only means by which man is 
able to regain a purely spiritual existence. 
Man's current existence is essentially flawed. If 
pure spirits had not fallen away from God, no "human souls" 
as we know them would have existed. But pure spirits did 
fall through the disobedient exercise of free will, and some 
fell in such a way that they became human souls. God joined 
these souls to bodies in order that they might regain their 
original spiritual status. The flaw in man's current condi-
tion is that he is a soul rather than a pure spirit. The 
body is God's means of enabling the soul to become a spirit 
once again. 
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The lowest level of meaning in Scripture, specifi-
cally the "weakest" aspect of this level, is the means by 
which God communicates the highest truths. In the same way, 
God provides souls, which are spiritual creatures, with a 
weaker aspect--the body--in order to lead these souls back 
to a pure spiritual existence. Even though the body is less 
spiritual than the soul, the body is able to assist the soul 
in its return to a higher spiritual existence. 
But by becoming a pure spirit once again, the soul 
will be forced to leave the body behind. As the Christian 
advances in the spiritual life, both the "bodily" meaning of 
Scripture and the human body itself will become unnecessary. 
If the Christian is reluctant to abandon the aspects of his 
existence which are too weak for his destined, purely spir-
itual existence, then even though these weaker aspects were 
provided for his salvation, they may become hindrances. 
In order for God's provision for the salvation of man to be 
effective, man must understand that eventually the body must 
be abandoned. 
Finally, we turn to the soteriological aspect of 
Origen's incarnational theology. Throughout his interpreta-
tions of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9, Origen emphasizes that 
the ultimate solution to man's current, fallen condition is 
the re-establishment of the soul's original similarity to 
the Logos. This original similarity existed between the 
Logos and pure spirits. Pure spirits were related to God 
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the Father in a way which was similar to the relationship of 
the Logos and God the Father. The salvation of man depends 
on the recovery of this relationship with God the Father, 
which is the essence of man's original similarity to the 
Logos. 
But man's soul cannot simply return to this rela-
tionship; the soul cannot simply retrace its steps and be-
come like the Logos again. Through its original fall, the 
soul has forgotten most of its true nature. Its union with 
the body can make the soul even more oblivious to its true 
spiritual existence. Since the embodied soul cannot make 
itself like the Logos, the Logos makes himself like the 
embodied soul. 
embodied souls. 
The Word becomes flesh and dwells among 
When the Logos becomes incarnate, he institutes a 
new similarity between himself and the soul. This similar-
ity consists of the fact that both the soul and the Logos 
share a corporeal aspect of existence. This new similarity 
is inferior to the original similarity of pure spirits to 
the unincarnate Logos since the flesh is inferior to the 
spirit. 
But when the Logos assumes a corporeal existence, he 
transforms that existence into spirituality. Thus, the 
Logos reveals to the embodied soul the spirituality of the 
soul's true existence. By contemplating the divine nature 
of Jesus Christ, the incarnate Logos, the soul becomes in-
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creasingly aware of its true nature, and is able to live 
according to that nature. The "weaker" similarity between 
the incarnate Logos and the embodied soul leads to the re-
covery of the original similarity between the unincarnate 
Logos and pure spirits. 
The ''bodily" meaning of Scripture must be left be-
hind in favor of the spiritual meaning; but the weakest 
aspect of Scripture communicates this spiritual meaning. 
The soul which becomes a pure spirit must lose its corporeal 
aspect; but the body is the means by which a soul may become 
a pure spirit again. The similarity between the embodied 
soul and the incarnate Logos will be superceded by the orig-
inal similarity between the pure spirit and the unincar-
nate Logos; but this original similarity cannot be recov-
ered unless the Incarnation of the Logos establishes the 
new, corporeal similarity. As Danielou points out, Origen's 
attitude toward all these aspects of man's current existence 
is the same. 
Origen believes the salvation of man consists of the 
recovery of a purely spiritual existence: a relationship 
with God the Father modeled after the relationship of the 
Logos to the Father. Man's corporeal existence cannot share 
in this higher existence; it is too weak and must be left 
behind. But Origen's theological anthropology declares that 
God uses the weak things of this world to redeem and re-
establish the strong. 
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43. Prologue to Cant., pp. 220-221. 
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Clement. 
45. Trigg, Origen, p. 203. 
thesis. 
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46. Tobin, Creation of Man, p. 87. 
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1. Prine. !!!,6,3; Trigg, Origen, p. 108. 
2. Trigg, Origen, p. 107. 
3. Prine. III,6,1. But see also Bigg, Christian Platon-
ists, pp. 240-241, and footnote 17. 
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11. Hom. in Gen. !,13; XIII,4. 
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13. But see Bigg, Christian Platonists, p. 247. 
14. Ibid., p. 273. 
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tian, Origen believes in the resurrection of the body. 
Therefore he qualifies his conviction concerning the incor-
poreality of spirits with a discussion of "airy bodies." 
(See Trigg, Origen, pp. 112-114) The issue of whether or 
not Origen departs from orthodox Christianity in his concept 
of the resurrection of the body is not directly relevant to 
this thesis. For our purposes, we can simply state that in 
this context, "corporeal nature" means a material body with 
carnal desires and defects, which is thus subject to corrup-
tion. Pure spirits cannot have this kind of body. 
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16. Danielou, Origen, p. 295; Maloney, Man, p. 13. 
17. Maloney, Man, p. 75. We saw in chapter 3 of this the-
sis that Origen assumes the rationality of man's spirit, 
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existence. This assumption makes it natural for Origen to 
describe the return to man's original spiritual state in 
terms of contemplation and knowledge. 
18. Danielou, Origen, p. 295. 
19. Maloney, ~an, pp. 75-76. 
20. See chapter 3 of this thesis. 
21. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 128; Grillmeier, 
Christ in the Christian Tradition, p. 142; Danielou, Origen, 
p. 257. 
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Origen, p. 261. 
Danielou, 
23. Trigg, Origen, pp. 14-15. The theological reasons for 
Origen's interpretations described by Trigg are not the same 
as those which are argued here, because Trigg is not prima-
rily concerned with Origen's exegesis of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 
2:4-9. 
24. Cels~ IV,3; VI,63. See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
25. This theme also appears in Contra Celsum, in the con-
text of Origen's Euhemerism argument. The "deification" 
Origen discusses does not only apply to Jesus Christ, but to 
Christians as well. Cf. Gamble, "Euhemerism." 
26. Maloney, Man, pp. 74-75. 
27. A discussion of Origen's Trinitarian theology is, of 
course, relevant to his incarnational theology--especially 
in regard to the Logos theology which Origen assumes in his 
discussion of the Incarnation. However, a complete discus-
sion of Origen's understanding of the relationship between 
God the Father and the Logos is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The problems inherent in Origen's understanding of 
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pp. 14-15 and Danielou, q~!gen, pp. 261-295. See Lyons, The 
Cosmic Christ, pp. 106-136 for a discussion of Origen's 
concept of the relationship of God the Father and the Logos 
which fits in well with this thesis. 
28. Hom. in Gen. XIII,4. See chapter 3 of this thesis for 
how Philo has influenced this interpretation. 
152 
29. Prine. III,3,7. This passage is somewhat obscure, but 
it seems to point to this kind of intimate similarity 
between the Logos and pure spirits. See also Lyons, The 
Cosmic Christ, pp. 111-115,127 and Danielou, Origen, 
pp. 254-255. 
30. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, p. 128; Lyons, The 
Cosmic Christ, p. 137; and Danielou, Origen, p. 261. 
Danielou thinks this is where Origen deviates from the 
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does stress the difference between the Logos and created 
spirits as well as the similarity between them. 
31. Trigg, Origen, p. 104 and Danielou, Origen, p. 257. 
32. Joseph F. Mitros, "Patristic Views of Christ's Salvific 
Work." Thought, 42 (1967), 421; Maloney, Man, pp. 68-69; 
and Gamble, "Euhemerism," p. 24. 
33. Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor: An Historical Study of 
the Three Main Types of the Idea of Atonement. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1969), p. 38; Danielou, Origen, p. 251. 
34. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, p. 142; 
Danielou, Origen, p. 258. 
35. Danielou, Origen, pp. 259-272. 
36. But see Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, 
p. 133; Danielou, Origen, p. 265. Several authors state 
that the Incarnation is important to Origen's soteriology, 
but stress other aspects as being much more important. 
37. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, pp. 52, 
143-145; Danielou, Q~en, pp. 262-263; Lyons, The Cosmic 
Christ, p. 137. 
38. Hom. in Gen. I,13. See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
39. Cels~ III,41. 
40. The need for the soul to be united to a body follows 
this same pattern. After the spirit becomes a soul, it is 
no longer able to simply reassert its spiritual nature. The 
soul cannot directly comprehend its true spiritual existence 
directly. It must be taught about the spiritual realm 
through something which it can comprehend. The soul can 
comprehend the body, so God unites the soul with a body in a 
material world which is similar to the spiritual realm. 
Thus, the soul can learn about pure, spiritual existence 
through the body. This is the assumption behind Origen's 
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exegesis of Gen 1:26-30 and Gen 2:4-9 in his Prologue to the 
Commentary on the Song of Songs. See Trigg, Origen, p. 203 
and chapter 2 of this thesis. 
41. Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, p. 148. 
42. Some authors think that the body is the reason why 
Origen cannot do without the ''middle term," the spirit which 
unites with the Logos. They assert that Origen, as a Middle 
Platonist, could not conceive of God as assuming bodily 
form. (E.g., Gamble, "Euhemerism," pp. 28-29) This position 
misunderstands Origen's theological anthropology. Man's 
problem is not that he is an embodied soul; man's problem is 
that he is a soul at all. 
43. Prine. II, 6, 5-6. See also Wolfson, Philosoi?hy, 
pp. 392-394; Grillmeier, Christ in the Christian Tradition, 
p. 146; and Trigg, Origen, p. 107. 
44. Cels. III,41. 
45. Trigg, Origen, p. 107. 
46. E.g., Cels. III,41. 
47. This understanding of Origen opposes Danielou's 
position. (Origen, pp. 261,296) The problem with Origen's 
Logos theology is not that he makes the Logos too much like 
pure spirits. Origen's insistence on the difference between 
them actually weakens his incarnational theology. 
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